Military Intelligence

April-June 1984

NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER



Features

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Military Intelligence

From the Home of Intelligence

Volume 10 Number 2 April-June 1984

Departments

This issue, **Military Intelligence** presents a look at intelligence at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, Calif. The NTC has received much media attention since its activation in 1980; witness the February 1984 "Soldiers," a recent segment on ABC's "20/20," and even a section of Jack Palance's "Ripley's Believe It or Not."

By now, it should be evident that the 1,000-square-mile NTC provides the most realistic training, short of actual combat, in the U.S. Army. The Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) has been used in Army training for several years, but at the NTC it has reached the state-of-art. The Opposing Forces (OPFOR) have been described as "awesome," and they know it. Video and computers are used to observe, record, and evaluate battles in detail that would be impossible for "mere" humans to match.

Have, then, is our look at the NTC; hopefully covering what is important to the intelligence professional. **Military Intelligence** would like to thank all professionals at NTC who help make this issue possible, especially Capt. Christopher Hamilton, who added his first-hand knowledge during final production stages.

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from the Commander

by Maj. Gen. Sidney T. Weinstein

Training of Military Intelligence soldiers and all soldiers, in general, is the most vital portion of the mission of the United States Army. The motivation of the command and staff and the foundation for the creation of the United States Army Intelligence Center and School was to sow seeds for the production of competent and proficient M I soldiers. This issue of **Military Intelligence** focuses on the training and evaluation of M.I. soldiers especially at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin. The National Training Center serves as the United States Army's means of testing and evaluating units during demanding combat maneuvers in the Mojave Desert. This training at Fort Irwin unveils the strengths and weaknesses of those soldiers on maneuvers. The results of this training reveals the leadership or lack of it of those commissioned officers, warrant officers, and non-commissioned officers responsible for the training of their soldiers.

Despite all the technological advancements, the manner in which training is conducted and the emphasis placed on it will determine the degree of success. The M I soldiers at the Intelligence Center and School have been encouraged and expected to take the lead in training initiatives. Such means as diagnostic tests of physical training and common tasks training have been implemented to insure that only well trained intelligence professionals wear the Military Intelligence insignia. Today's intelligence soldiers are required to perform a myriad of tasks and duties; yet, daily pressing demands must not let training "take the back seat." M I soldiers are fit to meet the challenges of demanding training. If we continue sharpening skills and improving training, they will be the best!

The United States Army Intelligence Center and School is at the forefront of developing new and innovative training. Units in the field are being confronted with the same challenge. The proficiency of the soldiers reaped will be a direct result of the type of training sowed. Keep your ideas flowing to the "Home of Intelligence." Our branch will improve, we'll all do our jobs better, and most importantly, the United States Army will be provided with the best intelligence possible.

from the CSM

by CSM Sammy W. Wise

The way we conduct business in MI is changing—and changing rapidly. The Intelligence Organizational and Stationing Study, the implementation of CEWI, the AirLand Battle doctrine, and the Army of Excellence concept are all contributors to the direction in which MI is going. Concurrently, we are addressing serious personnel management problems that have resided within MI for many years. Our approach is to look beyond bandaid solutions to our problems by developing permanent solutions which accommodate and blend in with intelligence requirements in today's Army. To ensure our proposed answers are correct and all required changes are implemented in a timely and professional manner, we need the collective support and combined expertise of soldiers in the field. This brings me to my theme for this issue—Communication, A Two-Way Street.

Contact Initiatives. There are currently six documents which establish open lines of communication between the field and the home of MI. They are the Commander's Periodic Significant Activities Report, Training Notes, Doctrinal Newsgram, **Military Intelligence** magazine, CSM's Letters to the Field, and special correspondence concerning a specific action. These documents are routinely mailed to all MI commanders, G2s and CSMs with a two-fold purpose in mind—to inform all members of the MI community on activities here at the Intelligence Center and School, and to solicit field comments on major branch initiatives. **Military Intelligence** is unique in that it is composed of articles submitted by MI soldiers stationed all over the world; soldiers who have ideas to share with the rest of us in MI. Initial feedback from the field reflects a genuine appreciation for this kind of informative communication and for the opportunity to contribute their ideas on matters that impact so heavily on MI branch as a whole. It is imperative that this two-way dialogue remains open to allow Maj. Gen. Sidney T. Weinstein to speak as the Chief of Military Intelligence with a clear reflection of the combined expertise of his constituency.

Mutual Benefits. Constant communication between MI soldiers in the field and the home of MI is mutually beneficial in several respects. The field is kept abreast on current and future happenings that affect career development, training, and unit organization and operations. Additionally, personnel outside USAICS can actively participate in the staffing process of MI branch actions by providing valued comments based on day-to-day experiences and on-the-spot perceptions. This permits USAICS action officers to identify and eliminate potential shortfalls or obstacles before the fact, rather than after, thereby saving a great deal of time and energy. It is our hope that MI personnel in the field do not view a request for comments on any issue as burdensome or unworthy of prompt attention. Project officers here at Fort Huachuca rely heavily on input from field units and trust those submissions to be well thought out and reflective of the concensus of the entire unit.

Information is for Everybody. In my visits to some MI units, it has come to my attention that informational documents for USAICS go no further than the addressee. This does not exploit the purposes of these documents to the extent it was intended. Information regarding the MI branch should be disseminated to the lowest echelons of each unit or section. Only in this way can we enjoy the benefits to be gained by having well informed soldiers in our units. Newly commissioned officers or junior enlisted personnel rarely are able to contribute much based on their experiences, but frequently can provide fresh, new ideas or a new approach to addressing an issue from their point of view. There is great deal of untapped potential in our young soldiers and, if we make a special effort to make them aware of what's going on, we will have better leaders in the future.

MI Branch to take the Point. The MI branch is truly leading the way in the Army in proponency, leadership, force modernization, and mission accomplishments. With a little more work, we can also take the lead in soldiering. Our goal is to have the best managed, best trained, most highly skilled, and best motivated **soldiers** in the Army. To achieve this, we have to continue to work closely together. We have to communicate. We have to keep our soldiers informed and, in return, we have to listen to their ideas. The Creed of the Noncommissioned Officer imposes on us the commitment to consistently communicate with soldiers in our charge and never leave them uninformed. This is a basic principle of leadership that has not failed us and will not fail us on our road to excellence.

BE ALL YOU CAN BE!

IN MEMORIAM

Colonel William Bradford Guild
1937-1984

Colonel William B. Guild was born November 28, 1937 in Boston, Massachusetts and graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1959. He was commissioned in the Infantry and served as a platoon leader and airborne infantry company commander until his branch transfer to Military Intelligence in 1965. After serving two tours on the faculty of the Intelligence School at Fort Holabird, Maryland and two tours in Vietnam, Colonel Guild then began a series of key command and staff positions which included duty on the staff of the JCS; MILPERCEN; command of the USA Field Station, Korea; Director of Counterintelligence, OACSI; command of the CONUS MI Group; and Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, INSCOM. His military schooling included the MI Advanced Course, Special Forces Qualification Course, Air Command and Staff College, and National War College. He also earned a Masters Degree in Business Administration from Auburn University. His awards and decorations include the Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster, two awards of the Bronze Star, the Meritorious Service Medal, Army Commendation Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, Master Parachutist Badge, Ranger Tab, JCS Identification Badge and Army General Staff Identification Badge. Colonel Guild is survived by his wife, Lucile, and their three children - Bill and Tom, who serve in the U.S. Navy, and Peggy who is an assistant physical fitness instructor.

REMEMBRANCES

★ ★

"I first met Bill Guild when he was Director of Counterintelligence in OACSI. A no-nonsense, straightforward, keen minded officer, he laid out the problems of the CI world for me with candor and precision. I had not anticipated, upon coming to OACSI, that we would push CI as far up the list of my priorities as Bill Guild soon had me placing it. It takes real professionalism and courage to make a case to one's superior that all is not well in one's own bailiwick and that one's superior ought to pay more attention to it. Bill had both the courage and personality to do that effectively, and we have all been the better for it.

Many thought of Bill Guild as a good commander, a good leader, a person who could win loyalty of subordinates and superiors alike. All that is true, but he also had a mind for good ideas that was a bit more insightful and reflective than sometimes appreciated. Not long before he left OACSI to assume command of CONUS MI Group, he brought in a fascinating memorandum which suggested some new directions and goals in CI that clearly transcended our traditional ways of doing business. Some of the ideas he had gleaned from others, some he had modified slightly, but the creative part was the integration of them all. The memorandum opened my eyes to a lot of possibilities that we were ignoring or pursuing with limited energy and mixed results. During his command of CONUS MI Group, I saw less of Bill, but on occasions when we could chat, I found the same vibrant personality and professional energy characterizing his attitude toward command and his assessment of our problems and progress. He came to the INSCOM DCSOPS position with a kind of commitment which everyone expected, making sacrifices of energy and time.

I encourage us all to remember his example of high standards and personal commitment. The MI Branch will pass any test if we keep close to the example Bill Guild has left us."

WILLIAM E. ODOM
Major General, USA
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Headquarters, Department of the Army

"Colonel Guild was an outstanding officer and Commander. He was the kind of officer that young soldiers looked up to. On several occassions I would wander by his office and sit around and talk to him and he would instill this sense of pride in me that could only be achieved by someone like him. COL Guild was Ex-Special Forces, Airborne, and a Ranger. He was someone you wouldn't think twice about following into combat. It is most certainly a tragedy for INSCOM and the US Army to have lost such an outstanding soldier as COL Guild."

EDDIE ORTIZ
Sp4 (P), USA
CONUS MI Group (Mar 81-Apr 82)
US Embassy, Thailand (May 82-Jan 84)

"I knew Bill Guild as a soldier and personal friend. He was indeed a soldier's soldier and an integral part to the "Green Machine". He was a natural leader: a selfless achiever of the highest order of magnitude: a superb example of quiet efficiency: a tower of strength: and a man of wisdom, professional and intellectual depth and pride (in self, unit and country), who possessed a high sense of duty and obligation to his troops, peers and superiors, and great self confidence born of demonstrated ability. He made his greatest contribution to the army of excellence during his battalion command tour where his untiring efforts, ingenuity, innovations, skillful planning, organizational acumen, and unequaled capacity to motivate people assured the successful development of the Army's first multidisciplined intelligence organization, the 501st MI Group, which I had the privilege to command. During that crucial period (1978-79) in Military Intelligence history, he commanded two major subordinate elements of the Group, the U.S. Army Field Station-Korea and the aerial exploitation battalion. Throughout our careers we see soldiers come and go. Some are remembered: some are not. Some make a difference: some do not. All of us who knew Bill will miss him. The army will miss him. He is gone but he'll be remembered because the was a "Professional Soldier", one who made a difference . . . in every endeavor."

JULIUS PARKER JR.
Major General, USA
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
US Army Europe/Seventh Army

"COL Bill Guild was not only a professional colleague, but one of my very dearest friends. Bill and I, and our families, have been very close since 1965 when we attended various intelligence courses together at Fort Holabird, MD. My memories of Bill encompass him as a complete person— a husband, father, and friend—as well as a professional MI officer. All who have served with him attest to his superlative professional qualities, and rightly so, since he was a magnificent soldier. He was also a magnificent person as was evident in the manner in which he carried out his other responsibilities. Bill was a very private person, caring deeply about his family, his friends, and his Army. His exterior revealed a particularly quick wit and mind, a great sense of humor, common-sense thinking, and an unpretentious, somewhat cavalier approach to living. Beneath that exterior was an extremely serious, deep thinking, caring individual very concerned with improving all he touched. He deeply loved and respected his wife, Lucile, and their three children and was justifiably proud of their many accomplishments. An enthusiastic update on their current status was always part of our frequent telephone conversations. Bill also truly loved soldiers and this love was reciprocal, as was evident in the number of enlisted soldiers and junior officers who attended his funeral. The genuine concern for his subordinates personal and professional welfare was reciprocated by their willingness to do whatever necessary to excel in any mission given them. He exemplified the confident, competent, and caring leader who good soldiers will follow anywhere.

COL Bill Guild truly left his imprint in this world and that mark transcended his many significant military contributions. His loss is grievous to all who served with or knew him, but to that special group who knew him as a close friend, his passing has created a void that no other can fill."

JACK PATTISON
Colonel, MI
Deputy Assistant Commandant
US Army Intelligence Center and School

"COL Bill Guild was exceptionally bright, dedicated, and he possessed great common sense. Generals Odom and Parker described those attributes well. He loved Soldiers, and his Soldiers respected and loved him. The comments of Specialist Ortiz reflect that fact, and I am sure there are hundreds of others who would echo what Specialist Ortiz has said. I met Bill in 1980 when we were in OACSI, DA together. He was always a joy to work with. He always knew what he was talking about, was always forthright, and he was also just great fun to be with. Our friendship continued from that time and there is no one for whom I had greater respect. He just was a very special person. Even just talking to him on the phone always brightened my day. The US Army and MI Branch have lost a great Soldier, but he has left us a great legacy of honesty and dedication. The world has lost a great human being, but Bill left a great legacy of good humor, loyalty, and love to his family and all who knew him. I have lost my friend and I miss him terribly."

SIDNEY T. WEINSTEIN
Major General, USA
Commander
US Army Intelligence Center and School

FEEDBACK

Editor:

Recently I had the pleasure of hearing Maj. Gen. [Sydney T.] Weinstein discuss the structure of military intelligence in the Army of excellence. He pointed out that we will have less personnel under the new concept, thus, we must improve our efficiency. Coming from a tactical background, this is no startling revelation.

Change is a continuous phenomenon in our Army, but it need not be negative. Several things could be done to increase efficiency at corps and below. First, we must discard older electronic systems that are man-power intensive, in favor of simple/light systems that are more reliable. Second, we must centralize low density MOSs to achieve economies of scale.

Under the new concept a MI company (124 personnel) would support the light infantry division, ACRs [armored cavalry regiments], and separate brigades. A reduced MI battalion (336 personnel) would support heavy divisions, and corps would retain the MI group.

General Weinstein asserted his support for the units below corps and outlined their very real intellligence needs. The original CEWI concept was a broad panacea; now, faced with scarcity, we must reassess our mission. One of the primary tenents of the IPB process, is the task organization of collection assets to achieve optimum results. Recognizing that we cannot possibly conduct every feasible mission, I would suggest the following changes:

- *Eliminate ground based electronic warfare assets from the group at corps. This function should transfer to units below corps to directly support the maneuver commanders.*
- *Concurrently, centralize the CI, SIGSEC, and OPSEC M&A functions at the corps group. Group would provide leadership and management for these personnel, and could support subordinate units with teams as needed.*
- *The AN/TRQ-32 should be discarded in favor of more reliable, mobile, and light systems, such as the WJ-8975 (AN/GRR-8).*
- *The AN/TLQ-17A, which is less reliable on ground transportation, should be converted into QUICKFIX systems (which are critically short).*
- *The AN/TLQ-17A should be replaced by the lighter, more reliable, AN/VLQ-4 (Piranha).*
- *The ground sensor terminal for the APS-94 side-looking airborne radar system should be added to the TO&E of MI battalions supporting heavy divisions. This would greatly increase the commander's ability to see deep, and fill a large gap in his intelligence support.*
- *Heavy divisions, and heavy separate brigades, will only receive the AN/PPS-5B, thus reducing the supply and logistical problems of maintaining two separate GSR systems.*
- *The other maneuver units will receive the AN/PPS-15.*

Technological advances such as J-STARS and ASAS, will be nice for the MI organizations of the future, but we dare not base our doctrine on promises of future super systems. Too often in the past we've been told that the next wave of technology will resolve all our problems. We must buy proven systems that maximize our results and design our organizations to realize the full potential of our soldiers. To support the intelligence needs for the AirLand Battle, we must take clear, decisive action **now**. We must streamline our units and procure the best equipment, so we can be, all we really can be!

Capt. Christopher A. Hamilton
Company F, USAICS

Editor:

*It is my hope that Capt. Bartholomew ("Reserve Component CEWI—Dead or Alive?," **Military Intelligence, January-March 1983**), will read the other articles in that issue of MI before launching RC CEWI. Of particular importance are Col. Harmon's comments ("Some Personal Observations on the CEWI Concept"). The Ursano study and subsequent AC experience demonstrate the vitality and necessity of making a commander's MI assets organic to his command.*

As Maj. MacCuish points out ("A Combat Army Officer's Perspective"), combat arms officers must learn to use the MI force multiplier. They must learn to sustain it as well. In the Reserve Components they won't learn it. The MI units are stovepiped in the USAR while the supported commands are in the National Guard.

As I understand it, the location of existing MI and ASA units in the USAR is due to an accident of historical politics. The reasons applied to counter-intelligence and SIGINT units in the 1950s are not applicable to CEWI units in the 1980s.

Capt. Bartholomew's consolidated training facilities concept is good—probably vital. But most of the eight (soon to be nine) National Guard divisions, 26 (soon 23) National Guard separate and Roundout maneuver brigades, and three USAR maneuver brigades are located in or near states containing major military installations suitable for CTFs. There are admittedly some problems, such as the 92nd Infantry Brigade (Puerto Rico) and the 163rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (Montana). But given the support and incentives set out by Capt. Bartholomew, and backfill from incorporated USAR units, the National Guard can man and learn to use organic CEWI units.

Capt. Edward M. McClure
North Carolina Army National Guard

P.S. Here's an idea for an MI "branch of service" or intelligence "function performed" map symbol:

Mnemonic: Asterisk or compass rose. Used alone it would mean a unit with mixed MI functions (e.g., a CEWI unit), or any intelligence function for which no other symbol exists. Possible combination meanings:

HOC, CEWI Bn

OPSEC/CI Unit

LRSO Co., TEB

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Editor:

As a military historian, I am collecting information about Canadians who served with American combat forces in Viet-Nam. I would very much appreciate hearing from anyone who has personal knowledge, or who can suggest related reference sources.

Sidney Allison
24 Ravencliff Cr.,
Scarborough, Ont.,
Canada M1T1R8.

Editor:

Military units often have contingency missions in which the possibility of deployment is remote; however, training for any eventuality is a part of the normal duty day. In the same way, we in the intelligence field train large numbers of linguists that will never be used adequately in peacetime, but must be ready at all times.

Military intelligence linguists fortunate enough to use their foreign language skills in some kind of mission find that their proficiency increases in direct proportion to the amount of language use. Likewise, linguists in contingency slots find that without use or study, their proficiency levels decline directly in proportion to the time the language was last used or studied. In an effort to keep language skills of linguists in contingency positions current, the Army, through AR 611-6, mandates unit language maintenance programs of at least 10 hours of weekly study of a priority equal to or greater than that given to most common military subjects. Also, funds are available to purchase foreign language training materials, hire instructors (through local education centers) and send linguists to various language schools.

On the surface, the unit language maintenance program sounds very comprehensive and workable, and it really can be, given the right command emphasis, motivated linguists and skilled supervisors at the unit level. Unfortunately, it's been my observation that the unit level foreign language maintenance program is a total failure almost everywhere. In fact, I'm stating categorically that the majority of reserve and active duty intelligence linguists could not perform their intelligence missions within their foreign language to strict ARTEP standards without weeks of refresher foreign language training. Needless to say, we may need these linguists an hour from now and we won't have time for them to go TDY to the Defense Language Institute enroute to their intelligence mission.

Do you think I'm exaggerating ?Take an informal survey of linguists in an intelligence unit or activity who are not involved in some kind of daily language use, and whose sole foreign language study comes from a unit language maintenance program. Ask them what they think of their current foreign language skills as opposed to where they think they should be. Also, ask them about the quality of their unit's foreign language maintenance program. Over the years I've asked military intelligence linguists from all over the world these questions and only rarely do I get a positive response.

Why is this? We have a strongly worded regulation and adequate funding. Why shouldn't unit foreign language maintenance be outstanding everywhere? Often I direct these same questions to linguists and I get some very revealing answers. Most tell me that the garrison unit just doesn't offer an atmosphere conductive to language learning; every other activity comes first: police call, rifle range, field duty, motor pool. Many troops have told me that whenever a detail comes up the language lab is the first place the first sergeant will hit for "duty bods." Often senior NCOs and officers in the unit who are responsible for the program are not linguists themselves and having troops "waste" time in language study is at the bottom of their priorities. Even when soldiers are grudgingly sent to the language lab, it's often with vague instructions to "study your language;" only a tiny percentage of units have an organized program for them to follow. Also, there's almost never a grade or evaluation given for any language study, so neither the soldier nor his unit receives any feedback as to how time is being used. Moreover, unit language maintenance programs usually go in spurts; someone will get concerned about language maintenance and there will be a flurry of activity for a few weeks or so, followed by long periods of inactivity.

Unquestionably, there are people in leadership positions who are aware of the problem, but so far no one has been able to really get a handle on the situation and turn it around, except for a few isolated cases. The Defense Language Institute has actively been involved in the unit maintenance program for years, but unfortunately they haven't had much of an impact. Take a walk through just about any office where military intelligence linguists in contingency missions are employed and you'll most likely see a pile of foreign language refresher books lying on a bookshelf gathering dust. I can tell you from experience that they are seldom ever opened. The idea that soldiers actually sit around in a office or language lab studying a language for ten hours a week as directed by AR 611-6 is not even close to reality.

I think it's time to try a new approach. Writing ARs and sending strongly worded messages from FORSCOM to intelligence units has not been able to solve the foreign language problem, and it never really can. In a military environment, tasks and skills which are easily quantifiable (haircuts, shined boots, physical training, equipment maintenance) will, in the long run, always take precedence over the softer, largely unquantifiable skills. It's time for a drastic overhaul in foreign language maintenance, not just another band aid solution. Here's how I think it can be done:

The first step in solving the foreign language maintenance problem is to institute Army wide testing every six months for reserve and active duty military intelligence linguists—not every two years nor every year, but every six months. I think most people who have supervised linguists will tell you that six months without any foreign language use can in most cases turn a good linguist into a poor linguist. In addition, scores on this biannual test should be determined by a percentile ranking of how all other linguists in the same language did on the test. An element of competition would enhance testing considerably.

Coupled with testing should be the institution of foreign language proficiency pay. Those linguists in the top percentiles on their respective tests should receive maximum proficiency pay, those doing only fair should receive less, and those at the very bottom should get nothing at all. Those soldiers consistently scoring poorly over a long period should be moved into something more suitable to their abilities. Further, proficiency pay for different languages

(continued on page 29)

СОВЁТСКАЯ АРМИЯ?

at the NTC

Story and photos by Sp5 Robert A. Kerr

It's 0324 hours. Little is visible on this moonless night. Except for an occasional crackle from the battalion TOC radios, the guards hear nothing and struggle to remain awake until relief arrives. Most of the unit's soldiers are asleep; they fought hard in the previous day's battle and a chance to rest is welcome.

Meanwhile, in the darkness nearly a thousand meters away, a truck grinds to a halt. The engine is turned off; no need to bother with the lights, they weren't on to begin with. Dark figures silently move from the vehicle and into the night, save for one, who remains with the truck.

Moments later, the group lies just outside the unit's perimeter. Guard posts are noted and avoided as they split up and move into the bivouac. A pair moves towards the TOC; a guard notices the movement and chooses to ignore it. The first of the pair slips through the tent flap; his partner waits outside. A sergeant, assigned to monitor the nearly silent radios, sips his fifth cup of C-ration coffee. Hearing the tent flap rustle, he turns to welcome the company. His jaw and the canteen cup drop simultaneously as he stares down the barrel of an AK-47.

Pvt. 2 Robert G. Darby with 7.62mm Romanian FPK sniper rifle.

"Keep quiet," says the intruder. His weapon remains trained on the sergeant as he moves towards the radios and mentally copies the frequency list posted on the table top. Finally, he turns the radios' frequency dials at random.

Outside, his comrades are in position. Suddenly, a flare illuminates the area. The sounds of automatic rifle fire fill the air. Startled soldiers scramble to grab weapons. Grenades explode. Amid the chaos, the intruders move surely. Communications systems are taken out of service; an anti-armor weapon is used against major weapons systems. Damage done, the intruders cover each other as they withdraw.

Back at the truck, the guard sets off a smoke pot. As his comrades return, he takes a headcount. There are no casualties tonight; sporadic automatic rifle fire still pops in the distance. The truck rumbles to a start and disappears under cover of smoke and darkness.

As the first light of dawn peeks over the mountains, the truck pulls up to a small one-story building. Soldiers move off the truck and into the building, weapons and equipment in hand.

As the AKs are cleaned and turned in, the duty NCO offers cups of coffee. Someone offers to get doughnuts. Two soldiers discuss the intricacies of MT-LB transmissions. Another brushes up on his knowledge of the T-62 tank. The first sergeant arrives and reminds the group to get some breakfast before the morning formation. Another duty day begins for members of Company C, 203rd Military Intelligence Battalion (TI), at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif.

"Our mission is basically to maintain all the foreign materiel used for training at the National Training Center," explained 1st Sgt. William E. Allen, top NCO at Company C. "There are actually only three MI types in the company; I'm a 96B, the commander, an O3, is a 35A, and the XO is also a 35A. The soldiers of the unit are mostly maintenance MOSs, with some armorers, and a few 19E tank commanders. I also think we're the only MI unit in the world that has a carpenter on the TDA.

"Maintenance is the meat and potatoes of this unit," he continued, "Everything else exists to support maintenance, and the maintenance is to support the National Training Center."

Allen explained that the unit is split into two platoons—Headquarters Platoon and Maintenance Platoon.

"Our Headquarters Platoon is basically the orderly room, supply, and the armorers," Allen said. "I'm very fortunate in that I have three company clerks.

UWT attacks

The Unconventional Warfare Team

SSgt. Anthony Jackson with 203rd's armor collection.

Sp4 Allan Benjamin with ZPU-2 antiaircraft machinegun.

Sgt. Johnny McMu

"The rank structure in this unit runs pretty high because these people have to be very good at what they do and very aware of how things work," he continued. "For instance, we have no U.S. weapons, they're not authorized. But I do have four armorers: an E6, two E5s and a private. They maintain a full array of Soviet and foreign weapons—machine guns, AK-47s, AKMs, AKMSs, RPG-7s, and others—and they maintain an ammo supply point stocked with live rounds for all the weapons we have.

"Upon request, we'll go out to the range and let rotational units familiarize themselves with any weapons we have on hand," Allen said.

"Another service we provide is our Briefing Team," he continued. "Our collection of foreign equipment is one of the largest in the United States. We have briefed hundreds of VIPs, the Secretary of the Army, foreign heads of state, graduating classes from Camp Pendelton, soldiers from the rotational units, and, basically, anyone who wants to see it."

The briefings are given in the motor pool area—an area that might be called "Ivan's Used Car Lot." Dressed in uniforms a little more flashy than the standard OPFOR field uniform, soldiers from the 203rd brief visitors on the equipment at hand. Beginning with small arms and machine guns, the briefing progresses to mortars, howitzers, and eventually to the 203rd's collection of armor. Although far from complete, most of the collection is operational.

Pvt. 2 Robert G. Darby, the youngest of Company C's armorers, gives the briefing on small arms. Darby seems intimately familiar with every weapon in his briefing and knows the specifications of the foreign weapons better than most soldiers know U.S. small arms.

Questioned on the reliability of Soviet small arms, Darby said, "I've never had a jam with any of these weapons. I use an AKS for the UWT and have never had any problems with it. They are easier to dissassemble and maintain than U.S. weapons; I'd take one of these into battle any day."

Sp5 Jim Strande is a 19E armor crewman and has served as a tank commander in conventional U.S. armor units. Strande enjoys being assigned to the 203rd, despite the fact that Fort Irwin is so isolated.

"I think I have a big advantage over the average tanker," said Strande. "I've learned a lot about Soviet weapons and tactics. Also, we get to do things everyday that I'd never get a chance to do in a regular unit."

"We have a large requirement in this unit for imagination," Allen said. "Our soldiers are not language trained, so handbooks and vehicle data plates are of little use to them. We rely heavily on their mechanical knowledge and desire to do a good job. You must remember that they have no prior training other than on U.S. vehicles."

"Everyone in the unit gets involved," he said. "For instance, when it was found that MILES equipment didn't fit onto AK-47s, our armorers went to work. Sgt. Jerry Latham fabricated a mount; we sent it to Aberdeen Proving Ground to be mass produced, and now we have MILES for our AKs."

Most of the maintenance activity in the unit revolves around the MT-LB, a Soviet armored personnel carrier.

The OPFOR motorized rifle regiment is composed of the 1st Battal-

Sgt. Larry D. Jarret with Soviet B-10 recoilless gun.

with Soviet T-55.

Sp5 Jim Strande with Warsaw Pact motorcycle.

ion, 73rd Armor, and the 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry. To duplicate authentic Threat infantry, the OPFOR infantry rides into battle in real MT-LBs.

"We originally had 18 MT-LBs," explained Allen. "We issue nine MT-LBs to the infantry for every rotation. We train the drivers in the care and feeding of the MT-LB, licence them, and they are always issued the same vehicle. To support this, each vehicle is assigned to a maintenance team. With this system, we get a relationship between the user and the mechanic. A tenth MT-LB is also fielded with a maintenance contact team. If an MT-LB throws a track, breaks a belt, or needs some other maintenance, the team is there in the field to make repairs. We keep five or six MT-LBs in reserve, but the contact teams are very sharp and we rarely need to bring a broken down track all the way back in to make repairs."

"I should also mention our Central Inventory Control Point," he continued. "We are the national CICP for MT-LB parts. The CICP is basically a warehouse to store our spare parts and other foreign material. We have an on-going project of sorting out unidentified objects and to match U.S. parts with Soviet or other foreign parts. Instead of being run by a warehouseman, our CICP is staffed by mechanics."

Imagination is a large part of the 203rd's Special Project Team.

According to Allen, "Our Special Projects Team is phenomenal. One of the problems we've had with MT-LBs is with the transmissions; when they're shot, we lose a vehicle. Special Projects has been working on Americanizing the MT-LB. They pulled the original engine and transmission. They replaced it by mating the engine from



SSgt. Sherri L. Morris repairs the wiring to the water temperature gauge on an MT-LB.

"Dead" OPFOR infantrymen sit atop their MT-LB while waiting for the battle to end.

Mechanic points to U.S. parts used in "Americanization" of Soviet MT-LB.



an M551 Sheridan tank with the transmission from M113 armored personnel carrier, and the transaxle from a duece and a half," he said, grinning. "A real hotrod job. The entire system costs approximately $6,000. If we had to buy an MT-LB transmission, it would cost in the hundreds of thousands. There are still a few bugs to be worked out, but it looks like it's going to work."

One of the more interesting pieces of equipment in the company's motor pool is a mobile arc welding rig. The body of the vehicle is a World War II vintage M211 GMC duece and a half truck that was found in Fort Irwin's Property Disposal lot. The Special Projects Team dragged it into their shop and went to work. Soon the unit had its arc welder, a modified generator, mounted on the rear of the old duece. One advantage to using the old truck is that few people in the Army can identify it, so when it goes to the field to support the OPFOR, the truck passes as "Threat."



"They are also working on putting American radios into BTR-60s so they can be used as OPFOR command vehicles," Allen added. "U.S. vehicles are currently used, but we want to get as much foreign materiel out there so that we can add to the realism. The big trouble is that U.S. electricity just won't match with Soviet. American alternators, batteries, et cetera, all have to be installed. Another problem is grounding the radios; we can't ground to the vehicle, the metal is different. The Special Projects Team is working on solving all of this.

"Another requirement we have is to provide prisoners of war for the rotation," Allen said. "We get a tasking from the Operations Group—'Star Wars Central,' as we call it—to provide personnel to be POWs. They give us the stories and we pull personnel from a duty roster. They are briefed on their cover stories, dressed in appropriate attire, and inserted into the exercise area at the prescribed time. The POWs are captured, processed through the units and eventually returned to the rear where they are debriefed."

The company also is required to provide an OPFOR Unconventional Warfare Team for each rotation. While the POW detail requires a duty roster, the UWT is strictly volunteer. (A typical UWT mission was described at the beginning of this article). Members of the UWT consider themselves to be rather elite. Once a soldier has served on the UWT for an entire rotation, he is authorized to wear the "UWT crest," depicting a skull over the crossed hammer and sickle, on the OPFOR uniform.

"The UWT is basically a group of raiders, similar to the Soviet SPETSNAZ," said Allen. "They attack brigade and battalion TOCs, TRAINS areas, and anything the Operations Groups wants them to. We have no Ranger types here; all the members are drawn from within the unit and have had no formal training in unconventional warfare besides what we have tried to give them here. They have been very successful; not every time, but I'd say about 99 percent of the time."

The eight to 14 members of the UWT ride to missions in an open "Blue Force style" M880 pick-up truck (one of only three American vehicles the company has). They carry MILES-equipped AK-47s and AKSs. While penetrating the Blue Force rear area, their only form of "camouflage" is the removal of their black OPFOR berets and concealment of their weapons. Success is dependent upon surprise, a bit of cunning, and maybe a little luck.

"In a conventional MI unit," said Allen, "your work is pretty much set from the beginning. Here, we have more of a need for imagination, dedication and maximizing the use of available resources than most units. You wake up every morning wondering what is in store for you today."

"I'd match my soldiers against anyone's anyday." ★

Sp5 Robert A. Kerr is currently assigned as staff journalist and assistant editor of Military Intelligence magazine. Kerr's previous assignments include duty with the 32nd Army Air Defense Command at Darmstadt, West Germany, the 2nd Armored Division (Forward) at Garlstedt, West Germany, and the United States Military Academy at West Point, N.Y. He is a graduate of the Defense Information School's Information Specialist, Newspaper Editor, and Intermediate Photojournalism courses.

Intelligence and Electronic Warfare at the NTC

Capt. Christopher A. Hamilton

The National Training Center is designed to train Forces Command heavy task forces in a mid-intensity, European environment. The NTC conducted the first brigade rotation exercise in January 1982 and by the end of fiscal year 1984, it will have conducted 29 of these rotations. That is a lot of training.

The NTC has a tremendous capability to measure and analyze unit performance, and several important trends have emerged. One indicates that commanders who use intelligence and electronic warfare support well, succeed. Intelligence does support the commander.

To support a rotational brigade, the Military Intelligence (MI) battalion takes elements from each of their four companies to create an MI Company Team. The MI Company Team is in direct support of the brigade. It consists of a commander, a ground surveillance radar platoon, an electronic warfare platoon, a liaison element, and a maintenance section. There are two AN/TRQ-32s and three AN/PPS-5Bs prepositioned at the NTC for MI Company Teams to draw upon. All other required equipment must be shipped from the home station (units without airborne jamming capability should coordinate with Sixth Army for reserve support).

The MI community is tasked with maximizing results. Good results have been obtained by units that are understrength and do not possess state of the art equipment. The units which succeed are technically proficient with their equipment, have strong junior leaders, coordinate continuously with the supported brigade staff, and have a driving desire to excel. The last item, call it hustle, will or initiative, can overcome many obstacles. Goals become clouded when you are tired, confused, hungry, and dirty.

This article is designed to help fine tune the training efforts of MI Company Teams preparing for rotation to the NTC. Tasks and procedures outlined in this article are based upon observations of MI officers and NCOs assigned to the NTC, recurring after-action review comments published by the NTC Operations Group, and interviews with MI Company Team personnel supporting rotations. The tasks presented here may seem simple or obvious; in fact, there are no departures from published doctrine. Certainly no single solution will fit the myriad of leadership challenges a unit faces, but the tasks outlined herein are basic managerial skills that must be accomplished for mission success.

Each person or section that participates as part of the MI Company Team will be discussed individually in this article. ***Readers will find handy lists enclosed for each section, and may wish to use these lists as a guide.***

Brigade Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support Element

The IEWSE, or liaison officer, is a very important component of the MI Company Team. The primary purpose of the IEWSE is to ensure the MI Company Team is used efficiently, by advising the brigade intelligence officer, and coordinating for the MI Company Team. This coordination is vital to mission success.

The IEWSE should have an experienced officer with a background in both all source intelligence and intelligence preparation of the battlefield. The position is usually filled by a captain, assisted by a senior NCO. The person who fills this position must have patience and persistence to achieve credibility. Credibility is the key to success.

At the brigade level, the close-in battle requires continuous monitoring. As a rule, the IEWSE should never fall more than 15 minutes behind the situation during an enemy offensive, or 30 minutes behind during a friendly offensive. It must alert the MI Company Team of major tactical moves, so that deployed sections have enough time to move to alternate locations and are not overrun by the enemy. If IEW systems at division or corps are available to assist the brigade, the IEWSE must request them expeditiously. The IEWSE is a quick reaction net for passing time-sensitive intelligence to the commander. Where possible, he aids the S2 in conducting hasty analysis of the intelligence reports from division and the MI Company Team. As anyone who has done this job can attest, the action gets pretty hot and heavy, so all personnel should be working during the battle.

After the brigade has fought the close-in battle, the LNO plans for intelligence collection to support the next fight; to help the commander see deep. The commander's priority intelligence requirements, the S2's reconnaissance and surveillance plan, and the mission of the brigade drive the MI Company Team effort. The importance of analyzing the mission cannot be overstated.

Each mission requires different intelligence coverage. During a defense in sector, the MI Company Team must plan for movement to ensure continuous monitoring. In a deliberate attack, the MI Company Team should be as far forward as possible to ensure coverage as the enemy retreats. The IEWSE may wish to request collection support to monitor high priority targets, or airborne electronic countermeasures (jamming). The team must know the brigade area of operations, and the area of interest as defined by the commander. Additionally, the IEWSE should know the area of operations and area of interest of adjacent units so it can request intelligence from adjacent MI Company Teams.

The liaison officer assists the S2 in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield. The LNO also helps the S2 pick the proper sensor systems to correctly cover the battlefield (including systems located at division or corps), determines the best or optimal location for GSRs, and determines when to conduct ECM. Essentially, the LNO plans the use of MI Company Team assets.

Once the best possible use of MI Company Team assets has been determined, the commander of the MI Company Team should be briefed. With this information, the commander and section chiefs begin reconnaissance of possible collection sites, request intelligence summaries on projected enemy units from the all source analysis center (this function is simulated by Operations Group), and plan the mission.

The IEWSE must ensure that urgent intelligence reaches the S2 from the MI Company Team, and conversely, that the S2 sends all INTSUMs and significant spot reports, to the MI Company Team.

Ground Surveillance Radar Platoon

GSRs have proven to be tremendously valuable tool to units rotation through the NTC. GSRs can be used during night offensives to identify enemy defensive strong points, and during night defenses to identify enemy personnel or equipment in front of friendly lines. GSRs can assist friendly units during attacks through smoke screens, or vector friendly personnel during night patrols. They can screen main avenues of approach, flanks, or obstacles such as ditches, and minefields.

One of the most important missions of the GSR team is to assist the task force in

countering the Opposing Forces' ground reconnaissance effort. The use of the GSR has been outlined in the Combined Arms Center Training Tips (Volume 2, Number 2, 2 Dec 83). CAC quotes an experienced OPFOR officer, "Our success comes from intelligence. If we find unit positions and obstacles, we win . . . Blue Forces are easy to template. The units that beat us are the ones that are able to keep us off balance. If we can't find them, if we run into an unexpected obstacle, or if they hit us from an unexpected direction, we're in trouble."

When coordinating for the mission, the team chief must know the mission of the supported and adjacent units, the enemy's probable course of action and major avenues of approach, and his own operations schedule. He must know reporting procedures, the communications frequencies/call signs he will use (GSR teams should take a minimum of CEOI materials forward), which maneuver unit is providing his security, and general site location.

Prior to occupying a position, the team chief should conduct a leader's reconnaissance to determine primary, alternate, and supplementary positions. The radar must have line of sight to the area selected for coverage. Without line of sight, the mission cannot be completed. Sites should also have good roads in and out, offer cover and concealment, and be located where radio or wire communications are possible. The team should occupy the primary site during dusk and should not be on the skyline (these measures will reduce chances of detection by enemy scouts).

GSR teams should have GTA 30-1-22 and a map board for plotting artillery fires. They must remember to account for the difference between grid and magnetic declination when aligning the radar. GSRs have been most effective when located with artillery observers to rapidly target enemy forces, and when located forward with anti-armor systems to provide range data.

Electronic Warfare Platoon Operations Section

The operations section serves as the EW platoon headquarters, and is responsible for controlling and managing the efforts of the platoon. The section executes the orders of the platoon leader/sergeant, and acts as a net control for the platoon. It maintains continuous communications with the IEWSE, and all deployed elements of the EW platoon, so the section must be located to achieve good communications.

The operations section should maintain a map board and post the locations of all detached teams, friendly units, and enemy units. The map board should identify alternate and supplementary sites.

The operations section tasks the intercept, direction finding, and ECM teams, based on guidance from the platoon leader/sergeant. The teams should be briefed on the brigade's mission, the disposition of friendly forces, probable enemy courses of action, technical data (as available or after you have produced it), control measures (such as frequencies not cleared for ECM), reporting procedures, and special instructions.

The operations section maintains a log of all intelligence reports. The section chief determines which communications nets should be targeted for either DF or ECM missions. Reports which identify locations of high value targets must be rapidly passed to the IEWSE, so they can be engaged by indirect fire prior to moving. All other traffic is analyzed, recorded, consolidated, and used to create the electronic order of battle.

The work flow of the operations section varies widely. At times the job can be tedious and operators lose interest. When the pace slows, wise members should use the time to update maps and log entries, obtain fresh mission data from the IEWSE, ensure that teams know the projected mission, conduct maintenance, and assist the platoon leader/sergeant as necessary. It is important to conduct these tasks continuously, so that personnel are free to rapidly receive and pass intelligence reports, during the mission.

Intercept Teams

Intercept teams produce the intelligence which drives the MI Company Team. Because no technical data base is provided, their product is used for developing the enemy electronic order of battle. The intelligence produced by the intercept teams is used for immediate identification of high priority targets, and developing targets for ECM or DF missions. (Although there is a limited amount of pre-recorded foreign radio traffic (Russian and Spanish), the majority of radio transmissions are in English. To reduce the possibilities of confusion or interference, all teams should be provided with a list of the frequencies used by friendly

personnel, data base should only list frequencies).

Intercept teams must be able to intercept enemy communications, and communicate with the operations section (when possible, it is suggested they use a landline to communicate with the operations section; this reduces radio traffic).

A reconnaissance should be conducted to find suitable intercept sites. A site that offers good radio line-of-sight to enemy transmitters is perferable. Good sites should be located near good roads (access and egress).

Based on guidance from the operations section, the team chief plans the work schedule to ensure maximum coverage several hours before and during battles. The team chief should also know when moves are planned.

Intercept operators must take the initiative and pass important traffic rapidly to the operations section. Routine traffic should not be passed over the radio. Operators should tag frequencies used by enemy reconnaissance and artillery units, and pass them at flash precedence. These frequencies must be targeted for ECM quickly to disrupt the enemy. Command frequencies must be monitored to determine the enemy course of action and to locate high priority targets.

Direction Finding Teams

A successful DF mission, when coupled with indirect fire, can cripple the enemy's ability to wage war. Because the modern battlefield is dynamic, targeting information developed through DF must be passed swiftly to the brigade staff.

The DF mission is an extension of intercept operations. DF missions require close coordination between several teams of highly trained operators, good radio intercept, and well-tuned equipment.

DF teams must develop a simple message format for passing mission data quickly; only line-of-bearing, frequency, and call signs need be passed. The analysts (usually in the operations section) have to compare the reports, plot them, and develop the suspected targets (remember, the positions must be compared with doctrine, and other intelligence for verification). Analysts must take great care when matching the reports of the DF teams, with a large number of reports it is easy to get the various targets confused (which will skew results). Team chiefs must set up a quick reaction net to rapidly task teams when target frequencies are operating.

It is extremely important that all DF systems have unrestricted line of sight to the target transmitter; even slight terrain masking will result in bad line-of-bearing readings. Further, DF systems should not be located in front of terrain features which might reflect radio energy, such as a rocky mountain (if the system receives signals from two sources your line-of-bearing readings will be incorrect). Additionally, the sites should be located near good roads so the team can access and egress the site rapidly.

Initially DF teams should take radio repairmen with them when possible. Repairmen can show operators the correct procedures for operating the DF equipment, and can conduct minor repairs or adjustments as needed.

DF is an art. To become proficient at this type of mission requires a certain chemistry or teamwork. This is only developed after long hours of practice, but the results clearly justify the time spent.

Electronic Countermeasures Teams

ECM is a powerful asset which requires planning and coordination by several staff members. ECM is frequently referred to as a combat multiplier, because ECM denies the enemy his use of the electromagnetic spectrum. ECM is a powerful weapon when employed correctly against units that are not prepared. However, on several occasions, units who had not conducted the proper staff coordination, did more damage to friendly communications than to the enemy.

ECM planners must analyze the mission and target communication nets which offer the greatest return (such as reconnaissance or artillery) when they are vulnerable. Prior to deployment, the teams must be provided with a list of protected frequencies (obtained from the CE officer) and a target priority list. The team chief must understand the desired effects of ECM; are they to prevent OPFOR reconnaissance units from passing intelligence, or are they to prevent calls for artillery fires from going through? The ECM team has equipment which facilitates target identification, and must be given the flexibility to engage lucrative targets rapidly (otherwise critical opportunities are wasted).

During the defense, ECM teams are located far enough behind the forward line of troops to ensure they won't have to move during the first hour of the battle (15-25 kilometers). In the offensive, ECM systems must be located as far forward as possible (5-10 kilometers). In both cases, ECM systems should be on high ground that affords good line of sight, and is easily accessible (ECM teams that cannot displace rapidly have a very low life expectancy). Sites are vacated immediately after the mission is terminated.

ECM assets are never held in reserve, if the team is not conducting an ECM mission, they are used as an intercept team, or they find targets for the DF team (assets do not sit idle).

ECM teams must monitor stop buzz in peacetime for safety reasons. They should also monitor the platoon operations net to obtain fresh targeting information, receive instructions on the progress of the battle, and cease operations if friendly unit communications are being affected by their operations.

ECM teams should also deploy with radio repairmen when feasible. Repairmen can be used to make minor repairs in the field and train operators to use equipment correctly.

Signals Security and Counterintelligence Teams

SIGSEC and CI teams both have a valuable role at the NTC. Rotational units are subject to enemy intelligence collection efforts while undergoing training. The OPFOR has two intelligence units. The Unconventional Warfare Team can conduct deep reconnaissance and/or raid missions. The Radio-Electronic Combat Detachment has the capability to conduct interception, DF, and ECM missions, and also provides the OPFOR with GSR support. The SIGSEC and CI teams have a mission to help the brigade commander identify and assess weaknesses in his operations security posture. Both disciplines have a tremendous opportunity to improve the OPSEC posture of a committed unit in a tactical environment.

Maintenance

Any unit not capable of maintaining equipment in a field environment will fail at the NTC. Maintenance at all levels is critical; if equipment doesn't work, there is no mission. All leaders, from the team chief to the commander, are responsible for conducting maintenance at every opportunity.

To conduct field maintenance, the MI Company Team must have qualified personnel, and the right equipment. Mechanics for wheeled vehicles, tracked vehicles (if the unit has tracks), generators, radars, and ECM equipment are absolutely essential. There must be a maintenance chief to conduct liaison with higher headquarters, oversee operations, and procure parts. If maintenance personnel are to assist deployed teams, then vehicles must be brought from home station for this purpose (and I strongly recommend it).

Maintenance teams should deploy to the NTC with all necessary tool sets to conduct hasty repairs in the field. The maintenance team should bring those items normally found in the prescribed load list for deployment. Because of Fort Irwin's harsh environment units should bring extra filters, belts, wires, straps, batteries, and connectors (dust, and the harsh weather wear these parts out faster than normal). Annual service checks should be pulled just prior to deployment.

It is particularly important for maintenance personnel to train in the field prior to deployment. The techniques and lessons learned in an austere training environment cannot be taught in a motor pool.

Leadership

The MI Company Team commander is responsible for the success of the mission; however, it is impossible for him to oversee the actions of every element. Accordingly, the commander must delegate responsibilities to his NCOs and junior officers, allowing them the flexibility to manage their teams or platoons. The commander and first sergeant will probably find that problem solving and control eat their time up rapidly, so they should not be afraid to utilize their junior leaders.

There are three plans which are absolutely critical to mission accomplishment. During the summer, NCOs must ensure personnel drink water on a planned basis (when working in the heat, soldiers should drink one quart an hour). Every unit must have sleep plans to ensure all personnel get at least four hours of sleep daily (leaders are not immune, and their lack of sleep has frequently been identified as a cause of

leadership failure). Personnel must eat regularly. Be leary that troops will avoid eating C-rations or complain that they are not hungry because of the heat (without proper nourishment personnel are easily fatigued, and increase the chance that they will become heat casualties).

NCOs are the backbone of the Army, and NCO leadership will determine the overall success of the mission. As outlined, the responsibilities for a junior NCO as a deployed team chief are great. Prior to deployment, junior leaders must always ensure they understand the mission, know the location of their site and the routes (both in and out), have a good map, have all the equipment to run the mission. Team chiefs should be sure that troops are properly dressed and equipped, have extra water, pre-test all radio equipment, and have a listing of the frequencies and call signs required to communicate with the supported maneuver unit, and the MI Company Team.

Closing Thoughts

At first glance, this can appear pretty awesome, but as I stated at the beginning, most of these tasks are simple. Training at the NTC can be a rewarding experience. The intelligence created is real and it will affect a real battle, not a game board. MI Company Teams have proved that MI works for the commander, and the people who participated in these efforts enjoyed their work. Units that are successful spend long months in the field preparing for a rotation to the NTC.

Rapport between the MI Company Team slice and the supported brigade can only develop in the field. The field is the place to identify and overcome training problems. MI Company Teams that consistently practice with the maneuver unit they will support can identify and solve coordination problems, which results in trust and understanding. The long hours do pay off, so make the commitment to excellence. ★

CPT Christopher A. Hamilton is currently attending the advanced course. He served for three and one half years in the First Cavalry Division, as a platoon leader, C&J, brigade liaison officer, and division EWSO. He developed and ran the Radio-Electronic Combat Detachment at the National Training Center, where he served for two and one half years. He is a graduate of the University of Washington, and is airborne qualified.

Friendly or Threat

Veterans of the Korean War may be able to identify this truck, currently in use at the National Training Center. Whether it is "Friendly or Threat," depends upon how you look at it. In any other environment, it would probably be considered "Friendly." But at the NTC, where it is used by the OPFOR mechanics of Company C, 203rd MI Battalion, it is "Threat." Modified to be a mobile arc welding rig, the truck is a circa-1951 GMC M211 deuce-and-a-half.

NTC HIP POCKET CHECKLIST

IEWSE

During the Battle

- Never more than 15 minutes behind battle during enemy offensive.
- Never more than 30 minutes behind battle during friendly offensive.
- Alert slice of enemy activity.
- Quick reaction net for passing time-sensitive intelligence.
- Aids S2 in analysis.
- 100% standby (no-call).

Between Battles

- Plan IEW asset employment based on mission, PIR, and R&S plan.
- Know area of interest and operation for supported and adjacent units.
- Assist S2 in developing IEW tasking/request assets from higher headquarters.
- Brief IEW slice CDR so he can implement.
- Ensure all reports flow from S2 to IEW slice, and vice versa.

DF TEAM

- Develop a simple message format with only frequency, call sign, and line of bearing data.
- Must have a quick reaction net to alert teams when a target is operating.
- Must have unobstructed line of sight, and can't be in front of a reflective surface.
- Preferable to have repairman with equipment.

GSRs

- Know mission of supported/adjacent units.
- Probable enemy course of action
- Reporting procedures, call signs, frequencies.
- Security.
- General site location/mission of S2.
- Conduct a reconnaissance: primary, alternate, supplementary.
- Ensure radar has line of sight to target area.
- Site should be easily accessable.
- Site should offer radio communications with supported unit.
- Occupy site at dusk.
- Use GTA 30- 1-22, and a map board.
- Remember to account for the difference between grid and magnetic declination.

ECM

- Target the most valuable nets—reconnaissance and artillery.
- Team must have a protected frequency list.
- Far enough behind during defense (15 - 20 K), offense (5 - 10 K).
- Near good roads, on high ground.
- Always utilized.
- Deploy with radio repairman.

OPERATIONS SECTION

- Acts as net control for platoon and passes info to IEWSE.
- Tasks all sections as directed by platoon leader/sergeant.
- Maintains map board with: all friendly/enemy unit locations, deployed teams, and proposed locations.
- Maintains technical data base on enemy units.
- Send all high value targets to either DF team or ECM team, and pass all targets (w/location) to IEWSE.
- Maintains log of all reports received and sends all reports by courier to TCAE.
- Must have good radio communications.

MAINTENANCE

- Everyone must conduct it.
- Must have the right personnel and tool set.
- Must have a leader.
- Must have transportation
- Bring PLL for deployment.
- Bring extra filters, cables, hoses, batteries, and connections.
- Conduct Q-service prior to deployment.
- Train in the field prior to deployment.

INTERCEPT TEAM

- Should lay landline to OPs section when possible.
- Must have good communications with OPs section if deployed.
- Must have good line of sight to enemy.
- Work should be scheduled for maximum coverage several hours prior to the battle.
- High value targets or frequencies should be passed to OPs section ASAP.

LEADERSHIP

- Must delegate responsibilities.
- Water, require all to drink.
- Sleep plans.
- Ensure personnel eat enough.
- Junior leader tasks are key (radio equipment functioning, know the plan, troops prepared, etc.).


INTELLI
OPFOR

GENCE at the NTC

Intelligence plays an important role in the operation of the Opposing Force (OPFOR) 32d Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment at the National Training Center. Limited in number of information collecting devices that a real Soviet Regiment would normally have, the OPFOR has developed a heavy dependency on aggressive reconnaissance patrols, ground surveillance radars, and the Reconnaissance Company to supply the latest intelligence information in sufficient detail to support its operations.

The OPFOR collection effort is a constant, 24-hour process that begins as soon as the regiment reaches its forward deployment area and continues until the termination of the exercise two weeks later. The OPFOR uses its assets to maintain constant contact and surveillance on the enemy forces.

The Reconnaissance Company, composed of four BRDMs, four BMPs and three motorcycles, initially supplies such basic intelligence as enemy front line positions and engineer activity directed toward obstacle construction. The company screens well forward of the regiment (five to seven kilometers) and uses its motorcycles to recon expected enemy positions. The cycles are difficult to detect, and can usually bypass the enemy's scouts and peretrate deep within the sector, gathering intelligence on enemy locations, engineer assets and possible obstacle construction areas. Observation and listening posts established within kilometers of the enemy's known positions can detect type, number, and direction of enemy vehicle movement.

The regimental intelligence officer, working in conjunction with the S3 in developing and planning operations, knows in detail the regimental concept for patrol planning purposes. The patrols are detailed from each of the regiment's three MRBs. These patrols consist of actual Soviet MT-LBs and selected personnel equipped with night vision devices, wire cutters, shovels and tank killing weapons (Dragons and Vipers which simulate RPG-7s and Sagger missiles). Controlled and directed by the S2, the patrols are assigned to recon planned routes of advance for their parent MRB or key terrain features which offer the enemy good defensive positions.

Before departing, the patrols are briefed by the S2 on the latest available enemy situation, and the essential elements of information which impact on the operation. In addition, each patrol is furnished a patrol order that includes a map overlay with check points, points of departure and reentry of friendly lines, call signs and frequencies. All patrols operate on the same intelligence frequency net so they can monitor the reports of other patrols and react to changes in the situation.

The patrols cross the line of departure during the hours of darkness the night prior to the attack, with the mission to cover the same route that their respective MRBs will be covering the next morning. Enemy positions, along with obstacles, are reported on contact to the intelligence officer/NCO located at the forward TOC. The EEI informs the patrol of specific intelligence items they must obtain. Because of the necessity to maintain momentum in the desert, the number one priority is the location of anti-tank ditches, minefields and wire barriers. A close second is enemy strongpoints with armored vehicle positions (tanks), anti-tank weapons (TOWs, Dragons, and Vipers) and squad level dismounts.

The patrols reenter friendly lines two to three hours prior to the regiment's line of departure time. At this time the S2 debriefs each patrol, and with a map for reference, plots exact obstacles and enemy locations. The patrols are then released from regimental control and assigned back to their respective MRBs. It is common for the patrol leader to ride in the same vehicle as the MRB commander during the attack, to report first hand directly to the commander.

Reconnaissance Company

The intelligence officer analyzes the information gained from the patrols, and relays the latest intelligence to the Reconnaissance Company, which has been screening throughout the night. With the mission of either going deep to locate the enemy's secondary fighting positions, TOC, or combat TRAINS, the Reconnaissance Company relies heavily upon information the patrols furnish to bypass enemy forward positions and to penetrate deep into the enemy's rear undetected.

Breeches in obstacles, such as anti-tank ditches, minefields, and wire, created by the MT-LB patrols allow the reconnaissance sections to penetrate the front line defense and advance deeper into the enemy's sector. After finding good cover and concealment, the reconnaissance elements can send continous situation reports to the regimental intelligence officer, and locate deep enemy positions, support elements, plus Class III facilities. Once the regiment makes contact with the defending task force, the reconnaissance elements can report the redeployment or repositioning of enemy forces to secondary fighting positions. At least one section has the mission to find the enemy's TOC and destroy it at line of departure time. This greatly effects the command and control of the task force at a very critical time of the battle.

The regiment typically places its ground surveillance radars well forward with the Reconnaissance Company throughout the night, with the primary mission of finding company team locations and determining the identification of the vehicles. The task force scouts are usually easily located either well forward or to the flanks of the task force.

The GSR is a critical element in assisting the patrols in the penetration of the enemy's front line defenses. Individual vehicle positions are identified, plotted on the map and gaps through the enemy's defense are noted. Wire communications is maintained from the forward TOC to the GSR position, and continuous spot reports are related throughout the night. This enables the S2 to inform the patrols if key terrain features are occupied along their route. In addition, if the enemy scouts detect the patrol and move to intercept the element, early warning can be provided. Also, the GSR can inform the regiment if the enemy repositions its forces after the patrols penetrate and depart the area.

Line of Departure Briefing

Two hours before the regiment is scheduled to arrive line of departure, the MRR commander, the regimental S-3, MRB commanders, chief of artillery and rockets, and all key leaders will meet for a brief intelligence update. The intelligence picture has developed throughout the night, with the patrols, reconnaissance company and GSRs reporting continuous updated information. The S2 uses the consolidated data to attempt to identify the defending task force mission as either defend to retain, defend in sector, or defend from a battle position. Company team positions, individual tank positions, critical obstacles and location of breeches are all reported and indentified on the map. The commander and the S3 then determine if there is a need to deviate from the announced plan in order to avoid obvious killing zones or to exploit discovered channels in the enemy's defenses.

Intelligence does not stop with the beginning of the attack. Throughout the battle the reconnaissance elements that are still alive report on the movement and repositioning of the enemy forces. The regimental intelligence officer, travelling in the same vehicle as the S3, is always in contact with the regimental commander, briefing him on the latest enemy situation and what the enemy's next course of action will be. Significant situation reports are sent on a net call on the MRR command net so that all maneuver elements are simultaneously updated on changes in the situation. Detailed planning and constant practice have been the keys to the OPFOR's intelligence collection success. The OPFOR has proved in practice that even when denied sophisticated monitoring and surveillance assets, an aggressive patrol-based reconnaissance plan can provide the detailed information the commander need to execute a successful operation.

1st Lt. Michael T. Pierson was commissioned in military intelligence from Carson-Newman College as Distinguished Military Graduate in 1979. Pierson holds a Master of Arts degree in Geography from East Tennesee State University, and has attended MI Officer Basic and the Imagery Interpretation courses at USAICS. He has served as an armor platoon leader, BIC officer, scout platoon leader and is currently the S2 of the 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry (Mechanized), OPFOR, at Fort Irwin, Calif.

Crossword Puzzle

MILITARY HISTORY



ACROSS CLUES

1. JOURNALIST WHO LIBERATED PARIS AHEAD OF THE ALLIED FORCES, AUG., 1944.
5. HE SAID "NUTS" WHEN ASKED BY GERMANS TO SURRENDER AT BASTOGNE IN 1944.
6. HE WON THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH IN 1778.
7. KNOWN AS "THE DESERT FOX."
12. HE WON THE BATTLE OF DIEN BIEN PHU IN 1954.
13. FRANCE'S MOST SUCCESSFUL 18TH CENTURY FIELD MARSHAL
15. LOST THE BATTLE OF THE LITTLE BIG HORN.
16. PHOTOGRAPHER WHO LANDED WITH U.S. TROOPS AT OMAHA BEACH, 1944.
19. THE LIBERATOR OF SOUTH AMERICA.
20. HER ARMY DEFEATED THE ENGLISH AT ORLEANS IN 1429.
22. HIS 12000-MAN ARMY HELD OFF AN ALLIED FORCE OF 350000 FOR 4 YEARS IN EAST AFRICA, 1914-18.
24. WROTE THE "ART OF WAR" CIRCA 500 BC.
27. HE WON THE BATTLE OF SEDAN, 1870.
28. HE WON THE BATTLE OF EL ALAMEIN, 1942.
29. HIS AIR FORCE WAS DEFEATED IN THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN, 1940.

DOWN CLUES

2. MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR DEFEATING THE CONFEDERACY IN 1865.
3. HIS ARMY RACED ACROSS FRANCE AND TOOK PARIS IN 1944.
4. HE WON THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.
8. HE SAID, "I SHALL RETURN."
9. ROMAN EMPEROR, CONQUEROR OF GAUL.
10. A HARVARD GRADUATE WHO PLANNED THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR.
11. HE WON THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.
14. HE WROTE THE CLASSIC, "ON WAR."
17. HE CONQUERED MEXICO AND THE AZTECS IN 1521.
18. HIS DIVISION WAS SLAUGHTERED IN A FRONTAL ATTACK AT GETTYSBURG IN 1863.
21. HE DEFEATED ATTILA THE HUN AT CHALONS-SUR-MARNE IN 451 AD.
23. BRITISH GENERAL BEHEADED AT KHARTOUM IN 1885.
25. THIS ADMIRAL DEFEATED THE FRENCH AND SPANISH FLEETS AT TRAFALGAR, 1805.
26. ----- THE GREAT BROKE THE MILITARY POWER OF SWEDEN AT POLTAVA IN 1709.

(solution page 43)

by Capt. Collin A. Agee

TEN TIPS *to make* THINGS TICK *in your* TOC *at the* NTC

"I've got so many additional duties that intelligence takes a back seat in my battalion. Although I'm the youngster on the staff and get ignored when it comes to training, I can take solace in knowing that I'll be the Old Man's best friend when the balloon goes up."

Sound familiar? If you're a battalion S2, it probably does. Too often we've let this be the junior MI officer's rationalization for the poor intelligence posture of his unit. Garrison operations do present obstacles to training and limited maneuver space seldom allows doctrinal portrayal of a motorized rifle regiment. The National Training Center at Fort Irwin, Calif., strips away the excuses by providing a deadly accurate opposing force and the closest thing to combat conditions a FORSCOM unit will see. Thrust into a battle for two exhausting weeks, the battalion S2 may reveal an inability to perform his ultimate mission in combat. But to a well-prepared "spook," it offers an opportunity to fine tune the intelligence section and prove to the commander how invaluable intelligence really is. . . in terms of lives saved and enemies defeated.

Although the following suggestions are based on observations at the NTC and are designed to assist S2s prepare for the rotation into the Mojave Desert, few of the tips apply solely to the NTC or the desert environment. The key to a successful rotation is the ability to execute Army doctrine. The standards presented at the NTC apply to all units and should be the goals of all tactical intelligence personnel. A word of warning—the NTC is the place for a tune-up and road test of your section. The pace is too hectic for an overhaul; you should peak on arrival and tie up loose ends as the scenario progresses.

Planning. A warning order from brigade should spur a flurry of activity in the S2 section, often concurrent with an ongoing operation. Textbook terrain analysis and perfect predictions of enemy activities are wasted if nobody outside the S2 track sees them until the operations order briefing. The commander and S3 need your recommendations as they develop their tentative plan. The fire support officer needs your input before developing the fire support plan, since it will only be effective if it is based on your assessment of where the enemy will, or may, be. The engineer must understand the enemy's intentions in order to logically develop mobility/counter-mobility plans. Effective combat service support planning requires an understanding of the factors of METT:mission, enemy, troops, and terrain. You provide the "ET" (and you can't phone home). As

stated in FM 30-5, "Combat Intelligence," "Until an intelligence estimate is available, detailed operational planning cannot be completed."

Reconnaissance and Surveillance. The S2 uses the reconnaissance and surveillance plan to integrate and control all assets available to the task force in seeking out the enemy, and finding his intentions and weaknesses, while depriving the enemy information about your own unit. The plan's ultimate products are answers to your commander's PIR. Intelligence exercises and command post exercises can create the dangerous impression that a massive volume of intelligence will flow into the TOC, leaving the S2 only the tasks of evaluating, interpreting, and disseminating the data. However, a task force without a sound R&S plan is like a man trying to blow out a candle with his eyes shut; it's tough to accomplish the mission and easy to get burned.

Although pages 10 and 11 of TC 30-28, the "S2 Reference Guide," provide a sample R&S overlay and a patrol overlay, it may be more efficient at task force level to combine them. To ensure adequate coverage of your sector, develop an R&S overlay that depicts scouts, ground surveillance radars, patrols, observation and listening posts, night observation devices, and any other assets that may have been made available to you, such as air recce, electronic warfare, or helicopters. The strengths and weaknesses of each asset should be carefully weighed so they can be used in a complementary manner.

Failure to maintain contact with enemy usually results in being surprised. But contact does not necessarily mean slugging it out with the enemy. Scouts are trained to seek information within the task force's area of influence. The scout platoon that boldly exchanges fire with the enemy is not as valuable as the one that observes the enemy in a march column, and while avoiding contact, identifies a regimental avenue of approach in time for the commander to adjust his forces and inflict significant damage with long-range indirect fires. Work with your S3 to ensure the scouts are used as an early warning/-collection asset rather than as an elite fighting force. The scout mission should provide security for the force, as desired by the S3, but must also be targeted against those critical intelligence gaps you need to have filled. The fundamentals of reconnaissance discussed in depth in paragraph 3-55 of FM 30-5 are worthy of review.

Ground surveillance radars are an invaluable resource whose capabilities are often wasted. They are in an ideal environment in the wide open terrain at Fort Irwin which frequently allows exploitation of their maximum range. Don't place a radar team forward with the scouts if the area they will scan can be covered from a more secure location. Remember that the electronic signature endangers the radar team as well as the scout. A team positioned without regard for its own security and directed to scan continuously is well-advised to buy life insurance before going forward. You must also plan for subsequent movement. Will teams deploy with, and be repositioned by company/team commanders? Or, will you use a series of checkpoints coordinated with the GSR platoon leader prior to the mission? GSR teams that habitually work with the same S2 naturally have a better handle on supporting the task force. Prior to deployment, coordinate and train with the teams you anticipate having attached to your unit.

Keep in mind that GSRs are more versatile than simply scanning potential avenues of approach at night. Consider limited visibility operations (smoke, rain, fog, etc.), vectoring (which requires regular practice by both GSR teams and maneuver units), the precision calling for indirect fires, and compensating for the difficulty of eyeball range determination in the wide open terrain at Fort Irwin. Twelve tasks for GSRs are discussed on page 35 of TC 34-50, "Reconnaissance and Surveillance Handbook," and a handy checklist for employment is provided on page 5. Compare those requirements to your SOP. Finally, ensure the R&S plan (to include overlay) is disseminated early to the entire task force orders group. The plan cannot be executed if those key personnel do not have it.

Requests to higher and adjacent units. Once your own assets are tasked by a well-orchestrated plan, look to brigade and adjacent units to supplement your efforts to satisfy the commander's PIR. Coordinate your needs with these units. Request that they provide you with data, or indicators, that are developed from the PIR, that will provide you with tactical early warning. Timeliness is essential. Your commander must be given enough time to adjust his operational

or logistical plan. When you request information from an element attached to, or supporting the brigade, ensure it is a request they are capable of fulfilling, not just an attempt to fill an impressive collection plan. A review of TC 34-50 will provide a worthwhile reminder of the collection assets available to an aggressive S2. Finally, remember that intelligence is a two-way street. Keep higher and adjacent units informed of activity in your sector, be aware of their PIR, and respond to their requests and orders whenever possible. Better support will be your reward.

Briefing. When you bat lead-off at the operations order briefing, make the most of it. It's an important opportunity to assist every element responsible for the success or failure of the mission. Know Soviet doctrine. Combat is not a closed book exam, so have reference material with you in the field and use it if needed. Recall your intelligence preparation of the battlefield training. **Do not** set a doctrinal template on your situation map and call that the enemy. As TC 34-3, "Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield," puts it, "It is important to note that the decision support template is the only real product of the IPB process. . . the only product the commander wants or needs to see." Any unusual or constricting terrain that affects avenues of approach will dramatically expose an ill-advised over-dependence on doctrinal templates alone. A motorized rifle battalion perched atop a mountain or in a swamp (a frog battalion?) may be the result.

Be certain to cover all the OCOKA factors. A good technique for discussing avenues of approach, in both offensive and defensive situations, is to put yourself in the driver's seat of an APC (or BMP) and talk yourself through the route, mentioning difficult terrain, choke points, likely points for altering your movement formation, cover, concealment, and potential objectives.

Your overriding concern in preparing the briefing should always be helping the soldiers of the task force accomplish their mission and defeat the enemy. Ensure that your graphics are legible. A terrain analysis that looks great in your M577 may be all but invisible to the scout platoon leader on the far side of the TOC extension. The gathering for the operations order also presents the opportunity to coordinate with company commanders on local patrols, OP/LPs, reporting channels, and other aspects of the R&S plan.

Train your section. If your unit has an S2, a battlefield information coordination control officer and a seasoned 96B analyst, you're part of a fortunate minority. But personnel shortfalls do not alter responsibilities in battle. Train your 11Bs and 19Es to be full-fledged members of the intelligence team, not just radio operators and drivers. Monitor their skill during exercises and run internal intelligence exercises. The NTC gives you a chance to check and improve their proficiency. You will discover that a knowledge of Soviet organization and tactics will greatly enhance a radio operator's ability to receive a message full of BMPs, BRDMs and MRBs without mixing them up. The more accurately and completely your section can record information, the more time you'll have to evaluate, interpret and disseminate it. When possible, include S3 personnel in your training program since significant intelligence traffic will be available from them.

Sleep plans. Another good reason to have an intel-wise section is so that you can rest without abandoning the tactical situation. War (particularly Soviet-style) runs 24 hours a day—so does the NTC. If you've been getting through FTXs on coffee, catnaps and a good attitude, you'll never make it at the NTC or in sustained combat. The shortcuts that pull you through three-day FTXs won't carry you for the two-week NTC training period. Initially, you won't even realize how much your efficiency has dropped, but your unit will suffer for it. Make your section adhere to a sleeping schedule, programming yourself to be awake at crucial times. Make the RTO sleep in broad daylight, even though he's in the middle of "War and Peace" or maybe a comic book. Otherwise, he'll be in eyeball defilade when the scouts call in at 0300. Doctrine covers sleep, too. Take a look at the discussion of continuous operations on page 5-28 of FM 71-2.

Spot reports. It's easy to remember what the acronym SALUTE stands for. It's tougher to follow it when T-72s have entered your engagement area and are shooting back. Classes may help. Embarrassing corrections on the command net certainly will. The NTC is the ideal place to evaluate and improve reporting by subordinate units. Bad habits tolerated in training are magnified under fast-moving, stressful conditions. Force your unit to report promptly, accurately and completely. At Fort Irwin, the OPFOR commander briefs his concept of the operation at every after-action review, allowing you to compare actual OPFOR activities to the picture painted for you on your radio nets. Remember that the majority of eyes on the battlefield belong to your own maneuver elements. You can't help them if they don't keep you informed. More than once, the OPFOR at the NTC has rolled up to a suprised TOC after passing unannounced through the whole task force.

Dissemination. Bring enough carbon paper to provide copies of your intelligence annex at OPORDs. That company commander may not be able to absorb it all at the briefing, but can make notes based on your verbal presentation, review your annex as he prepares his own order, and discuss it with his subordinates later. It helps get intelligence down to the lowest levels.

During the battle, a perfect SITMAP is worthless unless the information it contains is passed to leaders who need it. Get on the command net with a concise report if you've fit together the pieces of the puzzle. Strive to present information that will assist a commander in rationally chosing a course of action. **Do not** merely report what is plotted on your map—that's history. Deduce the enemy's most probable course of action and give your unit a chance to prevent the enemy from accomplishing that activity. Avoid repeating verbatim reports from higher echelons. Evaluate and intercept data before you disseminate it. Transmission over the command net, particularly in the heat of an operation, must be time sensitive.

OPSEC and COMSEC. The Mojave Desert offers unparalleled fields of observation. A jeep with the windshield up or soldiers with goggles on top of their helmets are invitations for an air strike. Skylined vehicles can expect incoming artillery. Blackout drive and "cat eyes" at night are like magnets for OPFOR night vision devices. A TOC situated in the topographic crest of a hill (ostensibly for

good commo) or with poor light discipline will not be operational for long. Nor will a TOC survive that remains too far forward in the face of an advancing regiment. Who is better qualified to recommend a TOC site that will be secure from the enemy than the S2? Does your unit routinely remote its antennas?

Cover and concealment are readily available anywhere, even in the desert, if you look for them. Waddies and washes provide defilade positions even in terrain that appears flat from a distance. These positions frequently offer fields of fire at maximum range and target acquisition even farther. Natural vegetation used for camouflage looks good even longer in a dry climate. The effects of drying out are minimized if everything in sight is already dry. Encourage your soldiers to inspect their positions from the front, to see what the enemy sees.

Occasionally listen to one of your tactical radio nets without any knowledge of the ongoing mission. Don't be surprised if you can soon identify checkpoints, phase lines, objectives and locations of friendly units. Then listen to the Admin/Log net to see how accurately you can determine the unit's status. Part of the problem is the lack of enforcement during training. An immediate correction of COMSEC violations must occur whenever a compromise is detected. Training and testing of correct radio procedures will also go a long way to tighten up your net discipline. Too many soldiers are unable to use CEOI correctly. How often have you listened to an incorrect authentication after a three minute "wait, out," while the RTO stumbled for his response?

Supervision. Control and supervision is a difficult, yet imperative, task for the S2 because his "eyes and ears" are soldiers from all the line companies and special platoons, his assets are largely attachments that don't work for him day in and day out, and these sources of information are spread throughout the task force sector.

The R&S plan is only the first step. Those assets must be controlled. Develop your own checkpoints and other control measures to assist you in tracking and adjusting them. Work out a reporting system so you will be alerted to new developments as they occur. Commo is the most common problem with GSRs; they must know how and when to report. Does you SOP include rendering negative reports? A GSR team that has been silent for three hours may have nothing to report in its sector. . . but it may have been overrun two and a half hours ago. How will company patrols be debriefed? All these items must be resolved early in the planning process. Many common glitches are the result of poor or nonexistent SOPs.

Experience has demonstrated that the NTC is an excellent showcase for the battalion S2 to shed garrison distractions and finally be what his job title states: an intelligence officer. The NTC has a debilitating climate, over a thousand enthusiastic, capable OPFOR soldiers, and 642,000 acres of unforgiving terrain ready to provide you with the most challenging unit training of your professional career. Are you ready? ★

Capt. Collin A. Agee is currently a Mech Infantry S2 observer/controller at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif. A 1980 USMA graduate, Agee's military education includes the MI officer basic course, the 35A track courses, the 5th Army Intelligence Training Army Area School OPFOR course and the Air Ground Operations School Battle Staff course. He was formerly S2 of the 4th Battalion, 61st Air Defense Artillery at Fort Carson, Colo.

FEEDBACK continued

should vary; pay for critically short languages should be higher than that for the more available languages.

I envision the language maintenance cycle working like this: Study materials composed primarily of current foreign language publications would be mailed to linguists from DLI. Cassette tapes of foreign language broadcasts, conversations and speeches would be mailed at the same time. The linguist would have six months to translate and digest this material, then he or she would go to the local testing facility and take a language test constructed from subjects in the study material. The tests would be sent to DLI, processed, and a foreign language proficiency paycheck, assuming the linguist scored within the acceptable percentile range, would be mailed to the linguist every six months.

A biannual foreign language test and proficiency pay would have several distinct advantages over the clumsy and unrewarding system we have now. First, there would be an up-to-date and accurate roster of language assets available throughout the reserve and active duty Army intelligence community. Second, there would be incentives to bring skills in secondary languages up to a viable level. As an example, there are a lot of linguists who have Vietnamese as a secondary language and have let this skill deteriorate because there has been no reason to maintain it. Allowing linguists to take biannual tests in more than one language would ensure that secondary languages learned elsewhere, such as college or DLI, aren't totally ignored.

The argument can be made that if we have proficiency pay for the linguists then we'll have to have it for other MOSs too. To this I can only say that foreign proficiency is so critical to the security of the country that it's really in a class of its own and can't be compared readily with other skills. This isn't to say that these other technical skills aren't important enough to have special pay, it just means that foreign language skills have to be looked at separately.

Wouldn't designing biannual study materials, writing tests, testing and proficiency pay be expensive? You bet it would. Expansion of the language maintenance program in the manner I've suggested would require a major strategic resource investment. However, what we would get in return for such a massive expenditure is the assurance of knowing that we have qualified reserve and active duty military intelligence linguists capable of immediate deployment without TDY to DLI enroute to their mission. What this is worth depends upon your own perspective. I personally think that it's absolutely essential.

CWO 3 Gary L. Smith
Co A, 311th MI Battalion
Fort Campbell, Ky.

Tenth Anniversary
1974-1984

Editor's Comment

Sometimes I didn't think we would make it - but here we are. The first issue of *MI Magazine* is finally in the hands of those for whom it was created.

A couple of things are important to remember about the magazine. First, it is a professional development tool of the United States Army Intelligence Center and School, but this in no way narrows its sphere of interests. *MI Magazine* is intended for all Army intelligence personnel - military and civilian - and we hope that it will serve all military intelligence interests. Second, *MI Magazine* is an authorized, unofficial publication - which allows it to be used for open discussion of new ideas, concepts, and areas of Army intelligence interest that need and deserve discussion.

Because we want the magazine to be a publication for all of us in Army intelligence, we will operate primarily on a contributor basis. This means that each of *YOU* will have to support us with articles, training tips, and ideas. Although on the whole the articles will not be staff written, the staff will, from time to time, contact individuals or units to ask for a particular article; but we are going to rely on your support to make the magazine viable.

I'd like to interject a brief note - I in no way want to dissuade anyone from contributing to the magazine, but I would like to ask that you not just dust off your research paper and send it in to us. Most research papers are not appeal and are much too long for *MI Magazine*. Please take the time to either use the research paper as a source of information to write a magazine article, or send us a copy of the research paper along with a brief explanation of how you feel the research paper can be re-written to provide an interesting and informative article for a military intelligence audience. The magazine staff will be happy to provide you with our suggestions on changing your research paper into a magazine article.

Although I'm sure that we have some bugs to work out of the system, every effort has been made to insure that all interested units and agencies have been included in our appropriated fund distribution. Also, our ratio of about five readers per copy of the magazine probably has not in all cases worked out. So... if you aren't getting *MI Magazine* and want to (or - and I can't imagine this - if you are getting it and don't want it); or if you are getting too many or too few copies, drop us a line and let us know so we can adjust our distribution lists. Remember, these free copies are for everyone's use and are not intended to be anyone's personal copy. Subscriptions are available either through USAICS or membership in the National Military Intelligence Association (NMIA). Tear out the subscription order forms and included in this issue.

The *MI Magazine* has got to be *OUR* magazine; all of us in MI need to support it - so if you have any ideas, comments or suggestions, please let us know.

The Aggressor Program At Fort Camp

First

In August 1972, the ACofS G2 of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) was given proponency for establishing an Aggressor progam which would assist in providing realism to division training and effectively train intelligence personnel at Fort Campbell. To accomplish this mission, the G2 established an Aggressor Advisor Team using personnel from the 101st Military Intelligence Company. One officer and two enlisted men comprised the original Aggressor Advisory Team, and the composition of the team has remained essentially unchanged.

The Aggressor Advisory Team acts as a cadre of technical advisors to assist subordinate units in the accurate portrayal and use of Aggressor. Obviously, the three man Aggressor Advisory Team requires occasional assistance and, when appropriate, is augmented with counterintelligence, interrogator, imagery interpretation, and G2 personnel. When so augmented, the Aggressor Advisory Team is efficiently equipped to assist the Air-mobile Commander in meeting his training objectives.

The program was started with very little actual expertise in use of Aggressor on the part of the team, which felt its way along until enough knowledge of Aggressor was gained to outline the coherent program which is now meeting the needs of the 101st.

First Lieutenant Jerry D. Boram

mpbell

did, however, and controlling Aggressor play
three distinct for unit ORTT and no-notice
first phase, all exercises and are actively par-
urces of infor- ticipating in unit tactical field
material were training.
e Training Aids No permanent Aggressor
fice (TASO) pro- force has been instituted at
mation on what it Fort Campbell because valu-
nd, what it could able training is obtained by
what it could obtain units portraying Aggressor and
channels. Fort Riley, this training should be rotated.
was contacted and Additionally, commanders are
remaining Aggressor reluctant to spare troops for
and information from permanent Aggressor detail
d Aggressor Center. The due to total unit training
ampbell Property Dis- requirement.
Yard was found to be a The Aggressor Program is
ble Aggressor supply de- nowhere more evident than in
actual Division field training
ith basic supplies and in- exercises. During the 101st Air-
mation amassed, the second borne Division exercise QUICK
hase was instituted. This EAGLE IV, conducted 12-20
hase related the Aggressor June 1973, a Brigade size
dvisory Team mission to the element was tasked to portray
specific needs of the com- Aggressor. The "Friendly" task
manders. The Aggressor Advi- force for this operation was
sory Team sought to incor- one Brigade plus Division
porate Aggressor in all aspects Headquarters.
of Division Field Training, Based on experience gained
particularly at Battalion and during earlier exercises, a
Brigade levels. After wide use combat ratio of 1 to 1 was
of Aggressor Order of Battle determined necessary to pro-
and equipment was established, vide a high level of combat
commanders began to wel- activities for the Brigade size
come the concept as it was friendly force. The Brigade size
providing realism to their Aggressor force also provided
training. sufficient personnel for un-
The third phase of Aggressor planned quick reaction
implementation emphasized missions and operational
the necessary involvement of changes determined necessary
Battalion and Brigade S2's in by the Division Command
supervising Aggressor activities Group.
within their respective units. During the planning phase of
Unit S2's became their own FTXs, a close coordination had
Aggressor Advisory Teams. developed between G3 and
Battalion S2's are now writing G2. G3 Training prepared the
concept of the operation to meet the stated training objectives of the exercise. G2 Analysis and Production Branch then prepared a general background scenario (using the Aggressor concept) to address the G3 requirements. Once the general scenario and concept were approved by the Command Group, normal pre-exercise planning continued. However, the unit tasked as Aggressor had to be provided specific instructions for its operational planning. G2 Operations, with assistance from the Aggressor Advisory Team, prepared a detailed letter of instruction (LOI) containing a step-by-step sequence of events and administrative guidelines for the Aggressor unit. This LOI also attached the G2 Aggressor Advisory Team to the Aggressor Commander for exercise coordination before and during the exercise.

The Aggressor Advisory Team supported the Aggressor Commander during exercise QUICK EAGLE IV by insuring that the proper equipment and uniforms were available to the Aggressor forces. Transportation of Aggressor equipment to given objectives was also coordinated by the team, and personnel designated to portray prisoners of war were briefed by the Interrogation personnel of the Aggressor Advisory Team. Objectives were properly positioned by the Aggressor Advisory Team, and the team insured that people and equipment were at the right place at the right time during the actual conduction of operations, thereby assisting the Aggressor Commander in following the planned sequence of events as closely as possible.

To insure that training requirements were being achieved and that any changes in plans were immediately passed to the Aggressor Commander, the Aggressor Advisory Team also had direct communications with G2 in the Division Tactical Operations Center. A quick reaction mission for the Aggressor was presented during exercise QUICK EAGLE IV when weather grounded "Friendly" transport aircraft, and a battalion size element of the "Friendly" force had to road march back from an off-post training area. The exact route and timetable of return was compromised by a communications violation. A convoy ambush was ordered. The Aggressor Advisory Team coordinated a successful ambush on two hours notice. During exercise QUICK EAGLE IV, the Aggressor Advisory Team was augmented with three counter-intelligence and four interrogator personnel. A significant quantity of intelligence indicators for each event was put into the play of the problem by the team, in order to provide realistic intelligence training for the friendly S2's. The CI personnel on the team monitored "Friendly" communications and functioned in an Aggressor EW role.

Field Training Exercises are not the only use for Aggressor at Fort Campbell. In Command Post Exercises (CPX) and Map Maneuvers, the Aggressor Concept is used extensively. Brigade CPX PAPER TIGER I, conducted 17-18 December 1973, employed the Aggressor Concept to fulfill the training objectives of the exercise. The Brigade staff prepared the entire CPX to include Aggressor Order of Battle and the scenario. In preparation for the exercise, the Aggressor Advisory Team presented a two hour controller school detailing requirements for equipment, procedures, and communications. The entire control group consisted of the three-man Aggressor Advisory Team, one Artillery Representative, one Aviation Representative, and one officer from each of the three maneuver battalions. The control element portrayed the enemy as well as "Friendly" higher, lower, and adjacent units and combat support elements. The exercise was successful due, among other things, to strict adherence to the Aggressor concept and comprehensive planning on the part of Brigade staff.

The Aggressor program established by the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) has proven successful at Fort Campbell, but is not the only possible application. The overall Aggressor concept is flexible, and if it has the strongest possible backing, coupled with imaginative use, it will prove to be a valuable training asset for any unit.

LT Jerry D. Boram is currently serving as Chief, G2 Aggressor Advisory Team, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). He was previously assigned with the United States Marine Corps as an enlisted air intelligence analyst, serving in CONUS, Okinawa and Japan from 1961-1964. Graduating from the University of Minnesota in 1968, LT Boram holds a business degree.

Due to his successful Aggressor program, he was invited to the Fort Monroe AD-HOC Committee on Aggressor in March, 1974.

In this, the tenth anniversary issue of **Military Intelligence** *magazine, we reprint three pages from our first issue. The "Editor's Comment" contains information which is still very valid today. In contrast to today's OPFOR, "The Aggressor Program at Fort Campbell" shows the way it used to be.* **Military Intelligence** *will reprint more articles from our first year in the next two issues.*

The Editor

Battalion S2 at the NTC

WAYS TO SUCCEED

By MSgt. Samuel I. Diamond

Since January 1982, the National Training Center has conducted force-on-force battle simulation rotations. These consist of brigade slices from two battalion sized task forces: one infantry heavy and, the other, armor heavy. One battalion task force operates against a realistic motorized rifle regiment, known as the opposing forces (OPFOR).

The visiting battalion S2 finds his job both challenging and demanding, since he must use his own initiative to stay abreast of the enemy situation and keep the commander and staff informed. Additionally, he must ensure his own staff section has been trained. Unfortunately, most of the S2's time in garrison is taken up by non-tactical intelligence matters, such as physical security and personnel security problems. His staff is knowledgeable on these matters, but is lacking knowledge and experience in the bread and butter of a tactical intelligence section—intelligence. The section must train before departing their home station; studying Soviet/OPFOR tactics, performing map reconnaissance of Fort Irwin remembering that the map is part of an underdeveloped picture (more on this later), and coordinating with the S3, to become familiar with his particulars.

The staff must practice the intelligence cycle and build a trust between the S2 and the intelligence section. Once at the National Training Center, the S2 must attempt to make a ground reconnaissance of the area, keeping in mind that what is on the map may be different from what is on the ground. He must also coordinate with the S3 and company commanders on the use of counterreconnaissance. This is vital; denying the OPFOR the use of their eyes and ears on the battlefield will also deny them the information they need to win. All the reference material that can be taken, should be taken. All reports received from both lower and higher elements must be checked. Don't take for granted that someone else has. Many times, "higher headquarters" will report items on the battlefield which are not relevant to the situation.

This is the S2's chance to process the information and sort out the critical intelligence from the unneeded information. There is quite a bit of reference material available on Soviet/OPFOR tactics, and it must be used. If information received does not corelate with known facts, it should be questioned. Call the sender and ensure they are sending the correct information. A common complaint of rotational units at the National Training Center is that the OPFOR regiment is hard to template. Remember, a template is a starting tool; it must be used in conjunction with the terrain and the situation.

A good up-to-date situation map is a must. The "school solution" of plotting two levels below yours is not always the best way to go. At the National Training Center, this can lead to map clutter. The situation map must be easy to read and must be kept current. If more than one platoon is spotted, it must be at least a company; if more than one company is seen, it must be a battalion. It is up to the S2 to plot and analyze the situation and to inform the S3 and the commander. Earlier, counter-reconnaissance efforts were mentioned. Once enemy reconnaissance units are discovered, the S2 must identify them and determine if they are elements of the regimental reconnaissance company or a combat reconnaissance patrol from the first echelon.

Another shortfall at the National Training Center is not involving the S2 in combat patrols. The S2, along with the S3 and the companies, must coordinate all combat patrols. This involves plan combat patrols. The S2 must, in conjunction with the S3 and the companies, coordinate all combat patrols. This involves planning, rehearsals, inspections, briefings, monitoring, and debriefing all patrol members. The S2 who is not involved often misses information important to develop recommended priority intelligence requirements for the commander. Patrol members may miss important information on the battlefield when not informed of what to look for. All patrols, not just reconnaissance patrols, have the mission of gathering intelligence information.

The age-old adage of the left hand not knowing what the right hand is doing must be eliminated when a unit comes to the National Training Center. There must be a good working relationship between the S2 and the S3. In too many instances, there is a lack of respect and understanding between these sections. The S2 must be made aware of the mission so he can adequately prepare his own course of action. The S3 must be made aware of the enemy situation by the S2. To defeat the enemy, the S3 must know the enemy's strength, capabilities, and probable courses of action. Success on the modern battlefield necessitates a coordinated effort. Remember, the first step of planning begins with the S2's estimate of the enemy situation.

The commander must personally be aware of what the S2 can do for him and the rest of his staff. Too many times the commander thinks the S2 is in charge of TOC security, or uses the S2 section as an additional command radio net. Commanders and S3s need to allow the S2 to do his job and this means getting him actively involved in the battle. An example is surveillance plans. The desert covers a vast

area and ground surveillance radars and night observation devices are blessings if used correctly. Many times no surveillance plan is made and either the GSRs are not used properly or are not in a position to report to the S2. The major problem with the GSRs and NODs is lack of control. The desert is an ideal place to train and use GSR and NOD teams.

Despite the use of the word "S2" in this article, one must remember there is an S2 staff. A typical field rotation of force-on-force training runs about nine days. S2s must pace themselves; it is impossible to stay awake to complete rotation. S2s must use their staffs, let them earn their pay and get as much rest as needed. This relates to what was discussed earlier—trust and training. Battalion S2s can do more tactical intelligence work at the National Training Center than at any other time in their military careers short of actual war. Previous training received, combined with common sense, will lead to a productive adventure at the National Training Center. ★

MSgt. Samuel I. Diamond is currently the senior intelligence analyst for the Division of Intelligence and Security, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif. He has served in various intelligence and armor assignments ranging from cavalry platoon sergeant to the first intelligence sergeant of the only OPFOR tank battalion in the Army. Diamond has served three tours each in Vietnam and Germany.

"OPFOR in defense"

TACTICAL COMPUTERS AND COMMON SENSE

by 1st Lt. Ralph Peters

Computers are now an integral part of tactical military intelligence. Unfortunately, this particular part isn't working very well. One recently fielded system was such a severe disappointment to users that many would simply like to turn away from it and move on. This is not an acceptable solution for a soldier.

First of all, tactical computers, as a concept, are here to stay. Secondly, we have made great promises and significant purchases we now have a moral obligation to fulfill. While waiting for perfected follow-on systems, we must make those systems we presently own work, and we must make them work without throwing good money after bad. I believe this can be done practically and swiftly. But we must begin by applying common sense.

Let us consider some of the respects in which we may have made poor decisions in the process of fielding this initial lot of tactical computers. It is hard for the novice user not to be dazzled by his initial contact with the computer and its champions. The "experts" speak in arcane language that soon leaves computer illiterates such as myself feeling mentally stranded. We are served finely-tuned demonstrations of the computer's seemingly boundless range of capabilities. And this is where the trouble really starts. Knowing that the computer can do all these things, our natural tendency is to want to make it do every one of them right now, without taking the time to indentify those functions that are mission essential.

We are seduced by the superficial glamour of the machine, and the next step we take down the path to disaster is the reorganization of our intelligence efforts to match the computer's capabilities: a bad and illogical decision. The military intelligence analyst must realize and remember that he is still the expert at his job. The computer has no innate capacity to organize success for him, either in training or on the battlefield. The computer is his tool. It is a tool with magnificent potential, but it is still just a tool, in the same sense that acetate for making overlays or marking pens and spot report forms are tools. They ease the analyst's task. The analyst's mission in this regard—and it is a tough one—is to try to understand this marvelous tool's present capabilities, as well as its very real limitations, and then to identify how and where the system can most effectively be employed **to assist in the overall effort.**

The mission and the commander's intelligence requirements do not change just because we have fielded a tactical computer. But there is a certain shock effect when the computer arrives in the unit. Everyone wants to show how quickly they have assimilated the new technology. It is here that clear thought and mature sense of purpose are critical.

Begin by recognizing that the computer can't do everthing for you even if it seems to have the technical range. Meaningful tactical analysis involves a constant battle against the clock. Presently, fielded tactical computers rely on a single keyboard both for the input of data and for data retrieval. For right now, we cannot perform both functions at once, and switching back and forth between functions takes time (the better the software, the less time required). Attempts to work a broad range of programs simultaneously on one system may not overload the computer's capacity, but it will swiftly overtake the operator's ability to keep up with data input in a high tempo combat environment. The spot reports, refined or unrefined, will begin stacking up beside the keyboard. And there is a real danger that, once the data base falls behind, it will never have the oppoutunity to catch up—at least not when it really matters. For all practical purposes, the system becomes worthless.

Try thinking small. Set realistic goals. Instead of trying to make the computer do everything for you, indentify the specific functional areas where you think it can help you the most. Don't be mesmerized by capabilities—think requirements. And don't modify good sense just because the genuine requirements you have identified lead you to use the computer in a manner that seems almost primitive to you. What matters is the extent to which the systems increase your effectiveness, not how many tricks you can make it do.

Basically, computers will perform two kinds of functions for us in the tactical environment:

1. Problem solving that is beyond human capability **within a given time frame.** Development of this capability mostly concerns artificial intelligence systems down the road; and:
2. Calculations that machines can do more efficiently and/or more accurately than a human can. **Time-saving** is the area where the presently-fielded systems, for all their limitations, can help us right now.

For example, when reviewing single applications in which a tactical computer could definitely assist the intelligence production section of the division where I am assigned, one functional area stands out. The majority of the requests (often anguished cries) for time-critical information that the division G2 receives are simply for the most current enemy locations, with activities implied. We have already gone to abbreviated, sharply focused and

highly effective response formats. The isolation of the truly pertinent information helps. Nonetheless, the information must still be copied down by an analyst by hand—and a weary analyst can miss a unit or make a mistake—before the desired information can be passed to the collection management and dissemination section. At that point, the limitations of current tactical communication systems add another aggravating time lag.

But, if priority of effort (on the computer) is given to maintaining updated enemy locations along with the strictly essential supporting data, the information will always be handily available—so long as the hardware remains operational. A further benefit is that the information is clearly printed. This may seem minor, but it is very important to the accuracy of transmission by the radio-telephone operator. The analyst's hurried scrawl can do great incidental harm, resulting in a flurry of queries and more lost time. Worst of all, mistaken coordinates or unit identifications may be accepted as factual.

The limited use of the computer described above may sound rather crude for a machine capable of so much more—but consider the relative value in results. Even more critical than the capability of transferring knowledge of the enemy's present locations and activities in a timely manner is that commanders and planners must make fateful decisions while struggling against the "unforgiving minute" about which Patton so often warned? A minute saved may mean many lives, ten minutes could decide a battle.

Just as computers do not exist apart from the rules of common sense, neither do they defy basic Army know-how as embodied in the principles of war or training methodology. Certainly, the principle "concentration of effort" applies to the use of the computer described above. And, in conducting training, we do not start off with the most complex tasks. The homesick private is not expected to plan campaigns during basic training.

So it is with assimilating the tactical computer (or any new system). First, learn how to make it do simple, meaningful things well. When elementary skills and techniques have been mastered, build on them. Do not try to impress the commander with your new computer's wide range of gimmicks. A quality commander may ask you some embarrassing questions. Instead, show him how it is going to directly assist him in fighting and winning the battle. First, make the darned thing work. Then, build methodically toward more complex utilizations and eventual "optimization." A simple rule for measuring success is this: if the computer costs you more effort than it saves in the field, you are certainly not using it effectively.

Now it is widely recognized that not all of the problems are with the user. But new hardware usually exhibits some initial unreliability. Again, think of the computer as a shaven-headed recruit. He will not become a perfectly skilled soldier overnight. Be patient and set reasonable goals. Do your personal best to identify problems, to solve them, and to share your knowledge. Nearly all of the fielded hardware is basically sound—it just needs time to recover from the shock of meeting GI Joe.

Software is presently the greatest problem. Again, the problem is a result of the failure to apply common sense. Civilians were expected to develop programs that would suit very complex, high intensity military requirements, and they proved to have neither the expertise nor the will to get it right. They settled for a very superficial "understanding" of the problem. The software produced was worthless to the serious user. Now it is vital to remember that, within the academic community, it is unusual to encounter a civilian who believes that anyone in the military can read and write. We still have a whopping image problem. Software writers just don't seem to believe that our requirements are all that complex or even serious.

There is a good common sense solution to this problem. Right now we are paying civilians who understand computers to "learn" about the Army. But at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, the Army has brilliantly talented officers and enlisted soldiers who do understand the tactical requirements and who also have the competence to develop software for us. Think long-term and it is especially obvious that MI is going to require its own in-house software generating capability, anyway. Let's start now.

I have personally seen the products and met the men and women who can rescue our presently-fielded systems and make them pay off handsomely. These men and women wear Army uniforms and MI brass. No civilian is going to do the job as well, no matter what his or her level of technical competence within the "computer community" may be. We are throwing our money away.

Meanwhile, the best thing units can do is to employ the local expertise walking around in uniform to program for their individualized requirements. Experimentation is critical for two reasons—every unit is going to have its own slightly eccentric requirements, its "way of doing things" within the overreaching doctrine of AirLand Battle. Therefore, whatever the even-

tual quality of our pre-packaged software, there will probably always be room for local improvements. Experimentation coupled with sustained dialog is the direct route to the future. In this, there is little difference between the military and the scientific community. Talent is never confined to one location—and the crucial breakthrough may well come from a remote and unexpected source indeed.

In closing, I would like to say a few words about the future. First, there certainly is going to be a future, whether we like it or not. To avoid further disasters, we need to begin critical evaluations right now of what we want tactical computers to do for us when more sophisticated systems become available. The fundamental rule should be to carefully and knowledgeably articulate your requirements then hold to them—the old "stick to the plan" of Clausewitz. Avoid being overwhelmed by sheer technology. Always ask that basic question, "What good is it going to do for me?"

The computer must never be allowed to become a true decision-maker. The proper role for the computer is as a decision-making tool. There is a world of difference here. The educated and experienced analyst will always need to keep a critical eye on the computer's products. But, together, man and machine can form a dynamic team. For instance, the computer-derived answer to a problem can serve as a sounding board against which to test the analyst's judgments. Often, the correct solution may lie in between. One tempers the other.

There are many forms of complex calculations that computers will be able to perform far more rapidly and accurately than the human analyst. As an example, consider transient trafficability equations. A common question the field commander asks is how well a given force will be able to effect passage of a particular bit of real estate. More often than not, the answer he receives today falls somewhere between the categories of a swag and an educated guess. A well-developed computer program, with a sound data base, could consider formations in terms of vehicle types (PSI ground pressure) and numbers, as well as known soil types, local relief, water tables and current weather, in addition to other significant factors.

A perfectly reliable answer may never be achieved, but in such an instance the machine may well come up with a sounder answer than the man, in a hurry. Certainly, the machine will do the equations more swiftly. Such computations should never become the sole criteria for determining the courses of action in an OPLAN, but they could be a useful tool to flavor decisions with requisite caution. At the very least, the tank commander could go into battle forearmed with the knowledge that he **may** be restricted to the roads in a given area. Another exemplary type of computation where the machine has a contribution to make would be in computing march data on enemy formations. How long will it take that division to get from A to B? The computer could consider many factors, from fuel availability (as known) and consumption for complex formations and adjusted doctrinal orders of march, to known road net quality (including average percent of slope, etc.), hours of daylight/hours of darkness for revised rates, weather, and numerous other variables down to a point of diminishing returns or probable obscuration.

The computer's answer would then be weighed by the analyst, with his experiential knowledge and honed instincts. The resulting answer might not only be impressive during briefing—it might be usable. And that is what it's all about. What works? What has real meaning? Do not be misled by gimmicks or by "prevailing wisdom." Try to think clearly and to ask good questions. Cherish simplicity. And go to work. Our present experience with tactical computers is just the clumsy beginning of a great adventure. ★

1st Lt. Ralph Peters is the Chief, Intelligence Production Section, 1st Armored Division. Peters joined the Army as a private in 1976 and was commissioned through OCS in December 1980. Previous assignments include the 8ID (M), and a tour as S2/Asst. S3, 1/46 Infantry, in Erlangen, West Germany. Peters' articles on operations and tactics have appeared in **Armor** *and* **Army** *magazines, as well as in other professional journals. He is rated as a native-level German linguist.*

Cryptocorner

by Walter B. Howe

O	C	I	Q	M	V	A	N	C	E	E	A	N	Y	C	A	R	T	Y
D	A	H	U	U	C	O	L	I	H	P	A	N	T	B	E	K	L	E
N	R	K	A	S	I	R	U	T	H	A	L	N	E	S	C	A	C	S
T	O	O	E	R	H	L	A	N	P	T	R	H	I	I	E	L	O	I
P	N	S	F	S	L	S	L	E	O	S	I	L	R	K	H	L	K	T
I	O	N	A	K	E	E	R	E	S	Y	I	E	I	M	A	E	P	L
G	B	E	C	M	C	R	S	A	R	Q	D	L	R	E	M	Y	U	S
Y	E	O	L	U	Y	A	D	E	U	O	E	U	S	C	M	N	R	R
K	T	O	R	I	O	P	L	E	R	N	S	T	A	H	E	O	V	U
C	H	E	R	C	U	L	E	B	O	S	A	S	M	A	R	T	E	Y
O	R	G	E	G	E	N	F	L	E	V	P	L	S	N	N	M	L	E
L	N	O	T	I	E	W	O	L	R	A	M	I	L	O	S	I	D	L
R	T	O	Y	D	H	C	L	O	D	M	R	P	L	E	L	O	N	I
E	E	D	D	E	I	C	B	E	C	O	E	Y	D	L	W	O	O	M
H	R	W	E	O	S	I	R	S	N	T	B	O	R	O	I	X	B	S
S	G	I	L	N	E	M	N	A	E	O	C	E	O	P	V	H	A	E
O	I	N	L	L	E	N	I	R	R	T	T	T	L	A	H	A	P	M
T	A	W	A	E	N	Y	A	W	O	L	F	E	O	N	U	L	D	A
N	M	S	T	R	E	E	T	R	E	C	U	R	B	E	V	E	R	J
R	O	T	C	E	P	S	N	I	N	O	D	O	L	E	C	A	R	R

This issue presents you with a very different kind of a challenge from the usual cryptograms. The word-search puzzle below conceals the names of 30 spies, secret agents, detectives, and crime fighters from popular fiction through the years. The square also contains a quotation from a popular spy novel.

To find the quotation, you must eliminate all the hidden names. The letters that remain spell out the quotation. To help you find and eliminate all the names, the last names are encrypted and listed for you to use.

First names or titles are not listed, but do appear in the square. Each part of a name, first name or title, middle name if there is one, and last name all run in different directions, but follow one another with the first letter of the next part always beginning in an adjacent square to the last letter of the previous part. If this isn't altogether clear, it will become more apparent when you start to find the names.

HRFS	UTXFP	ORINPG
UCNGPX	GJBPPJ	LRCBRJ
JBTEX	NTCWBPJ	WCSPRF
QTFEP	FR	EOTBIPG
TIIPXF	NRJR	RTMPG
GNCIPX	MKBXTMCF	NTGRF
NTBIRUP	EOTF	HIRYPIS
GRIR	DKCIIPB	BKGGPII
GNTBJ	DKPPF	OTNNPB
URIYP	WRRSUCF	GLTSP

G O O D S O L V I N G!

(solution page 43)

by SFC T.P. Elliott-Smith
and
Capt. James V. Slavin

There are those who maintain that military intelligence has been dragged kicking and screaming (back) into the tactical Army. Regardless of the truth or myth of this statement, tactical MI training is alive and well at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Since 1981, when the MI branch representative prepared a staff study recommending an upgrading of intelligence skills in cadet training, MI skills have been steadily integrated into cadet life, through the Military Science curriculum.

The greatest infusion of MI training has been into Cadet Field Training, an eight-week program of field environment training similar in purpose and concept to ROTC summer camp. Whereas a cadet's first summer spent in USMA's intensive version of Basic Training (Beast Barracks), CFT gives cadets their first taste of hands-on familiarization and training with common soldier skills in such areas as: artillery, armor, infantry, engineering, NBC, signal, and now, tactical intelligence. CFT is conducting for two months preceeding the cadets' yearling (sophomore) academic year. The intelligence instruction is presented during the initial stages of CFT and reinforced within the cadets's infantry training which is the final stage.

The intelligence segment of CFT is conducted by the Tactical Intelligence Committee, one of nine committees which manage the 3rd class summer training activities. This committee is manned by USMA personnel and summer augmentation troops drawn from active and reserve Army units. CFT 83 saw six officers drawn from the USMA staff and faculty, ten personnel from the 203d MI Battalion at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., personnel from the 364th MI Company, USAR, stationed at Hanscom AFB, Mass., and 60 personnel from the 311th MI Battalion (CEWI) and the 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). Traditionally, the USMA summer training is supported by an augmentation force drawn primarily from either the 82nd Airborne Division or the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault).

Intelligence training involved ten hours over a period of 12 days in a field environment. The intelligence field training program itself is centered around activities at five separate locations. Cadets received an initial briefing on MI, emphasizing the different collection disciplines and the techniques and equipment used. Time was spent explaining the possible routes a career in intelligence could take and the potential for being commissioned MI upon graduation. Due to the fact that each graduating class is only allotted some 30 MI slots, the main theme of this presentation, along with the entire tactical intelligence training at CFT, was MI awareness and appreciation for MI's tactical role. It is of the utmost importance that each cadet realize the application of intelligence in whatever branch he or she may select upon graduation. Through this introduction, the myths of MI are erased and the necessity for sound tactical intelligence in each branch was strongly emphasized.

The second training event consisted of a concentrated four-hour block of training at the newly constructed tactical intelligence field site, VanDeman Range (appropriately dedicated to the Father of Military Intelligence, Maj. Gen. Ralph H. VanDeman). This training involved four one-hour, performance-oriented classes: POW processing; reporting combat information using the SALUTE format; surveillance of the battlefield using ground surveillance radar; and platoon level operations security. All, except the surveillance block required cadets to achieve a "go" on a performance test after the formal instruction. The soldiers of the 311th MI Battalion (CEWI) and 1/506th Infantary blended their tactical and technical expertise while presenting their classes to over 1200 yearings. The 101st soldiers were given basic guidelines to emphasize the tactical role and importance of intelligence to the combat soldier.

The third training event consisted of a two-hour segment of instruction on SIGINT/EW, wrapping up two days of training in communications and electronics. In this training, cadets received an unclassified orientation on SIGINT. The classroom instruction, in conjunction with the practical exercise, illustrated the dangers and difficulties of operating in the radio electronic combat environment.

The fourth training event consisted of a three-hour block of instruction during the cadets' anti-armor weapons training. This instruction was conducted at a simulated Soviet site in which cadets received two hours of instruction on small arms orientation, observed a live fire demonstration, and actually fired the AKMS assault rifle. At the conclusion of this OPFOR training, each cadet came away with an appreciation for the Soviet weapons' capabilities and, hopefully, a feeling of the Threat. Also, in conjunction with the anti-armor training, a one-hour performance oriented class was conducted on recognizing and targeting Soviet combat vehicles. (This class required previous cadet study of a locally produced recognition and targeting manual.) The instruction emphasized the vulnerabilities of the vehicles. Excellent concurrent training was provided by having cadets put their hands on operational Soviet vehicles (a T-54 tank, a BTR-60 fighting vehicle, and an M10 motorcycle). The 11th MI Company of the 203rd MI Battalion, in coordination with the 364th MI Company (USAR), stressed the importance of quick and accurate recognition and destruction of the Threat vehicles.

To round out the Soviet orientation, NBC and communications displays and briefings were presented in conjunction with other CFT training sites. The theme of integrated training was again prevalent to reinforce the intelligence role within each branch of the Army.

Finally, the combat intelligence training was reemphasized during the cadets' Infantry Week. PW processing, surveillance of the battlefield and reporting and working through EW were integrated during this week. At this point of summer training, the skills emphasized previously were incorporated into the field training exercise.

Overall, USMA has only introduced the cadet to the periphery of combat intelligence. Through the Military Science curriculum, he or she will receive a small amount of Threat awareness during the yearling and cow (junior) academic years. It is the individuals' basic course that will be the next step for intelligence training. This CFT tactical intelligence training may not be portrayed as having a major impact on the Army's future officers, but USMA has come a long way and is instilling the need for good intelligence regardless of the officer's speciality. A step in the right direction! ★

SFC T.P. Elliott-Smith served as the NCOIC of the Tactical Intelligence Committee CFT '82 and '83. He is a medical analyst in the 364th MI Co (TI), USAR. In civilian life he is a professor of humanities at Massasoit Community College in Massachusetts.

Capt. James V. Slavin is currently the MI Branch Representive and an instructor in the Department of Military Science at USMA.


1MAR84
07 38 34
HYDRO
CITIES
GRIDS
MIST
OBSERVED

OMPUTERS MONITOR the ATTACK of the OPFOR REGIMENT

Photos by Sp5 Robert A. Kerr

One of the National Training Center's unique capabilities is the use of video and computer equipment for monitoring battles.

MILES-equipped OPFOR "T-72s" and "BMPs" ready for the attack in the assembly area (lower left), while Air Force A-10s harrass from above. Soon, the tanks rumble across the desert (far left) to meet the Blue Force. A "T-72" brakes hard when a Blue Force M-60 is discovered (top center). Meanwhile, the crewmembers of a "BMP" await the battle's end, having been "killed" by Blue Force dismounted Dragon gunners.

In the Operations Center miles away from the battle, Capt. Heath Davenport, an Operations Group intelligence officer, monitors the action on a video monitor. All action is recorded and is used by observer/controllers to give after action reviews to visiting units.

"The closer you stand, the more you see."
John Dryden
17th Century Political Poet

"SPY QUIZ"

An Uncommon Security Awareness Program

by Capt. John W. Davis

Counterintelligence asserts that spies are potentially everywhere. How can we better detect them? This article will discuss one way that works. "Spy Quiz" was a series of humorous newspaper articles with a serious intent; to develop intelligence leads. Perhaps others responsible for security awareness will find this method helpful.

It is common knowledge that only a good security awareness program makes counterintelligence possible. Deployed in small offices throughout the Army, counterintelligence must rely on all other soldiers to be its eyes and ears. This can be accomplished through security awareness programs. Our success in developing leads is directly proportionate to those soldiers we can make enthusiastic about recognizing and reporting, for example, espionage incidents. Perhaps, however, we in counterintelligence are too esoteric in our approach to security awareness. Conversely, we may be too mechanical. A paradox develops. We sometimes make our job obscure and vague, shrouded in mystery. This happens while at the same time we rely only on the standard semi-annual SAEDA class to develop leads. Thus, troops feel alienated from something that they think they don't understand, or become bored when they hear the same security awareness classes over and over. A true paradox is evident, and thus the problem is identified.

How can we end this problem and develop leads? How can we make the average soldier enthusiastic about reporting espionage, or, increasingly, terrorist related incidents? We care about the reality of spies. How can we make others care? How can we do this, when to the obscure tower guard the world of international espionage seems miles, even lifestyles, away? Where do we begin?

It is a truism that espionage techniques have changed little over the years. This being the case, the danger of repetitious boredom can become all too apparent in our security briefings. But this is precisely why espionage approaches continue to succeed. Consider, however, that people remember the unusual. We remember good jokes. We like snappy witticisms. The trick is to put the same old story in a way that will appeal to something common to us all.

We assert that hostile intelligence techniques can be taught. Thus, they can be categorized for ease of understanding. Further, in discussion with experts in the field, it seemed to me that we could reduce each technique into a simple summary. Something that is so simple to summarize should not be that difficult to convey to persons not conversant in the CI field. How best could we convey this simplified summary of hostile intelligence techniques to the soldiers themselves?

Time, **Newsweek**, and **People** are probably the most popular magazines today. What do they have in common? Short, carefully constructed articles. People tend to glance at an article, and if their attention is not caught in the intial paragraph, they will move on. Consider also how most magazines have some sort of quiz or questionaire. Everyone likes to know where he stands on any issue. Thus, he will fill out the answers to the quiz just for fun. What if the scenarios described in the quiz were those selfsame hostile intelligence approach

techniques, presented in a readable, interesting way? What if we go one step further and provide not only the answers to the questions, but a number the reader can call if any of the little scenarios in the quiz ever happens to him? That is the basis for "Spy Quiz."

"Spy Quiz" was the result of summarizing hostile intelligence techniques into short quiz form, with funny answers provided in addition to the actual answer to the espionage/terrorist approach. Three newspaper presentation methods were used by various field offices where "Spy Quiz" was employed. First, numerous questions were presented all together on a quarterly basis. The answers to the quiz would be provided to anyone who called the field office. Another method was to provide numerous questions, but to provide the answers in the paper. Lastly, three questions were printed in each issue of the paper, and "Spy Quiz" was renamed "Espionage Quiz." Something common to all methods was the last question, "Did anything like the situations described above happen to you?" The telephonic response was gratifying. Leads were developed. The possibilities of similar quizzes are endless. As is often said, "imagination is the only limitation." A sense of humor can catch people's attention. We also found that it can catch spies. As the English poet said years ago, "Look closer, and you may see more than meets the eye." After all, as counterintelligence professionals, that is our job. Herewith, some samples from "Spy Quiz:"

1. Capt. Fraction takes his classified work home to meet deadline report requirements. Knowing this, you should:
   a. Prepare his impact ARCOM for the extra effort.
   b. Provide him with the Confidential or Secret cover sheets, as appropriate.
   c. Verify that he only takes work related classifieds.
   d. Alert his supervisor to take action and halt the practice.

2. A four day pass! Just enough time to go get those weird photos of the Iron Curtain before DEROS.
   a. Just be sure you have enough film.
   b. All photos must be cleared through your S2 on return.
   c. No military person may travel within one kilometer of the inner German border without authorization through channels.
   d. Iron will not come out on Polaroid film.

3. Your caller doesn't want your advertised rhinestone on velvet cheetah painting. He wants your military phone book instead. You should:
   a. Call mental hygiene.
   b. Say you'll think about it and get back with him, then call Military Intelligence right away.
   c. Lower the price of the painting.
   d. Check the ad for typos.

4. "I'll trade you a Libyan hookapi for your ID card," said the guy on the Strassenbahn.
   a. Just another adventure in the Army. How exotic!
   b. A Libyan hookapi? Don't have one of those. What a deal!
   c. Sorry. My ID card is government property. Non-transferable. (By the way, call the MI, they can tell you what a hookapi is.)

5. While driving the Helmstadt-Berlin Autobahn, a German Bo Derek lookalike has auto trouble on the side of the road. Knowing basic German, you:
   a. Gallantly stop and offer assistance.
   b. Stop and give her the ADAC phone number in East Berlin.
   c. Pass her and continue driving.

Captain John W. Davis was commissioned as a Distinguished Military Graduate from Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri in 1975. He served for five years as a Field Artillery officer in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). After graduation with honors at the Defense Language School in German and the 36A Counterintelligence course, he branch transferred to Military Intelligence in 1980. For the next three years he was the commander of the Mannheim, FRG, field office of the 527th MI Bn. After a tour as instructor at the Department of Human Intelligence, USAICS, he entered the MI officer's advanced course.

Cryptocorner Solution

Names:
James Bond, Lord Peter Wimsey, Dick Tracy, Philo Vance, Roderick Alleyn, George Smiley, Phillip Marlowe, Napoleon Solo, Maxwell Smart, Nero Wolfe, Bruce Wayne, Della Street, Inspector Maigret, Doctor No, Mr. Moto, Ilya Kuryakin, Charlie Chan, Quiller (no known first name), Ellery Queen, Archie Goodwin, Sherlock Holmes, Hercule Poirot, George, Nora Charles, Blackford Oakes, Perry Mason, Ernst Stavro Blofeld, Colonel Russell, Mike Hammer, Sam Spade

Quotation:
"I mean you can't be less ruthless than the opposition simply because your government's policy is benevolent..... That would never do." from "The Spy who came in from the Cold," John LeCarre, 1964.

Reserve Toll Free Numbers

The MI Branch, U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Center has toll free numbers for MI reservists to call for information. ARPERCEN can also give information to active duty personnel considering going on reserve status after separation. Addresses and numbers are:
Officer Branch—Commander, USARPERCEN, ATTN: DRAP-OPD-MI-CA/FAO, 9700 Page Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63132, Toll Free 1-800-325-4988.
Enlisted Branch—Commander, USARPERCEN, ATTN: DRAP-EPB-MP/MI, 9700 Page Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63132, Toll Free 1-800-325 4760.

Crossword Solution



LANGUAGE TRAINING OFFERED

"Buenos dias. ? Commo esta Usted?"

"Guten Morgen. Wie geht es Ihnen?"

If you'd like to learn another language, the Army may have a special opportunity for you. The Army is looking for soldiers in career management fields 96 and 98 (Intelligence) to volunteer for language training, according to a spokesperson for the Military Personnel Center's language training office. Soldiers selected for the language studies will attend training at the Defense Language Center at the Presidio of Monterev or Presidio of San Francisco, Calif., or with the Foreign Service Institute Department of State in Arlington, Va.

A few of the 37 language training courses available in fiscal year 1984 are Afrikans (AA), Bulgarian (BU), Arabic Modern Standard (AD), Russian (RU), Spanish American (LA), and Czechoslovakian (CX).

Soldiers interested in acquiring a language skill must:

- Be a high school graduate or have a GED equivalent. Soldiers who completed a non-English speaking high school must have a standard score of 45 or higher on the high school level GED Test 1 and 2.
- Have a Defense Language Aptitude Battery score of 89 or higher, or have previously completed a foreign language coures at the Defense Language Institute.
- Have at least an interim Secret security clearance.
- Have no major speech impediment.
- Have a physical profile serial of "1" in the psychiatric of "S" factor and minimum hearing acuity of "2" in the "H" factor.
- Score 100 or higher on the skill technical test, or general technical test (for those tested before may 1973).
- Complete basic and advanced individual training before entering the language course. This does not apply to individuals training for the 98G specialty.
- Waive unfulfilled enlisted or reenlistment commitments in accordance with Army Regulation 601-210 or 601-280.
- Not be on a current enlistment with an enlistment bonus or selective reenlistment bonus. See Chapter 9, AR 600-200.
- Meet the reenlistment eligibility criteria outlined in Chapter 2, Paragraph 2-11, AR 601-280. Soldiers who meet the requirements may volunteer by submitting a DA Form 4187 to Commander, USA MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-EPT-L, 2461 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22331. Each request must include an updated DA Form 2, DA Form 2-1, and verification of DLAB score. Soldiers should contact their local military personnel offices for futher details and help in filling out the DA Form 4187.

Soldiers selected for language training incur a service obligation, as outlined in AR 614-200.

Additional information appears in the DA Circular 350-Series (Language Training for Enlisted Personnel). Details include class schedules, starting and ending dates, specialties, grades, and programmed units of assignment.

The military Personnel Center's point of contact for availability of language training spaces and quotes is Ms. Bowers at Autovon 221-8415/0640 or commerical (202) 325-8415/0640.

By the way, both phrases at the start of this story mean, "Good morning. How are you ?"

AUTHENTICATION ALERT

by Capt. William A. Ross, USAF

The aircrewmember has been evading for six days. He's exhausted from evading the enemy, lack of sleep and food, and dehydration. He has camouflaged himself well and has selected the best possible hiding place. For two days Charlie has walked near him, almost stepping on him. Each time this happened his heart pounded so loud he was convinced that the enemy patrol could hear its rhythm. Undoubtedly, he will become a POW, never seeing his country or family again. However, a day has passed without any signs of enemy patrols.

Confidence sets in, "Perhaps I will be able to escape and evade to friendly lines or Jolly will come in looking for me. I know I can do this E&E stuff." Suddenly, he hears the distant whomp whomp of Jolly's propellers slicing through the thick jungle air. The sound grows near. His excitement leaps. The crewmember switches on his PRC 90, which he turned off to conserve the batteries, and hears the crackling noise of Jolly (rescue helicopter) communicating with the King (airborne lingo for Search and Rescue) aircraft. He knows by this time that the enemy also hears the chopper and is probably monitoring the airwaves. Knowing that SAR knows his general landing area, he tries to initiate contact with SAR. Unbelievably, King hears his transmission and relays the information to Jolly. Jolly responds and starts broadcasting a request for vectors.

The crewmember nervously whispers the vectors into his survival radio. As Jolly approaches they ask him to authenticate by giving Jolly the sum of his four digit personal authenticator number. Suddenly something does not seem right, that is not the procedure his squadron intelligence officer has taught him over and over again for the last three years. Perplexed, he begins to think perhaps these are not friendlies and Charlie is trying to trick him into compromising his position. Since he never learned this procedure, he decides it is Charlie and shuts down his radio.

He still hears the chopper and surprisingly it overflies his position. Unquestionably, it is friendly and in desperation he fires a flare which was not seen by Jolly but was easily seen by Charlie. Like bees to honey, he is surrounded. Captured. POW. Eight long years.

Unquestionably, rescuing a downed crewmember in enemy territory is a formidable task. At times, the rescue environment is extremely intense. For instance, Jolly might be taking small arms fire while trying to locate and authenticate a wounded crewmember. In turn, the crewmember is probably petrified. Therefore, due to the intensity of a search and rescue operation and a crewmember's physical and mental condition, the USAF must have a superbly efficient authentication system.

Since SAR authentication is sometimes the last step between returning home or becoming a POW, a crewmember usually endears SAR procedures to his heart and soul. Furthermore, it is intel's job to insure that crewmembers know this system and that crewmembers memorize the authentication information on their 1833 Personal Authentication and Identification System (PAIS) card. During authentication training, intelligence instructs crewmembers to use the authentication procedures found in AFR 64-3, which states, "A crewmember will authenticate by giving SAR forces his call sign, name and the four digits of his PAIS number." However, as proven by various SAR exercises, this is not the "state of the art" authentication method and if the Air Force continues to teach this procedure it might adversely affect a crewmember's rescue.

Numerous SAR exercises, such as Empire Glacier, Red Flag, and Cope Thunder, have proven that several variations to the authentication procedures outlined in AFR 64-3 have occurred. For example, during a Red Flag SAR exercise, in which I participated, SAR forces asked a crewmember to authenticate by broadcasting the sum of the last two digits of his four-digit PAIS number.

Since authentication is a stimulus-response action, the crewmember did not immediately respond to the strange stimulus. He further delayed his response while he consulted with the other survivors on the unusual procedure. The conclusion derived from the consultation was "perhaps he (SAR) is part of the enemy forces." The crewmember asked SAR to repeat the transmission. Once again, the crewmember hesitated to respond, but eventually decided to "risk" transmission and broadcasted the sum of his last two digits. Following the crewmember's response, SAR asked one of the four PAIS authentication questions.

Subsequently, the crewmember vectored Jolly to his location. Total time to accomplish authentication was approximately twelve minutes; a procedure which should have taken about two minutes. At the mission debriefing, in which the survivors and simulated SAR forces participated, the pilot of the Jolly asked "what was the problem out there?" He stated he was 20 seconds from leaving the rescue area since he initially thought the survivors were enemy forces trying to vector him into an ambush. When asked what procedure the SAR pilot would use in real world situation, he stated that he would use the same procedures I used during that particular rescue. In another Red Flag, a similar situation occurred. The difference was that the crewmember did not vector Jolly until Jolly authenticated itself to the survivors.

This was done by a survivor asking Jolly to tell him the answer to his first question. In other words, the survivor reversed the procedures. The catalyst for the survivor's action was the confusion generated by the SAR forces deviation to AFR 64-3 procedures. Once again, SAR stated they would use the dissimilar procedures in a real world conflict. Additionally, these same deviations, or ones similar, have been extensively used during Cope Thunder SAR exercises. During Empire Glacier, I saw another variation to authentication. This method is called the alpha authentication system.

Within the alpha system, each crew position is assigned a phonetic letter thus enabling SAR forces to know who they were talking to. For example, a WSO would be designated "Bravo" and he would authenticate by using his position number rather than his name.

According to the search and rescue liaison officer at Red Flag, "There are no standardized rescue procedures in the USAF." Survival instructors from Detachment 2, 3636th Combat Training Wing at Nellis AFB, stated, "The authentication procedures taught to crewmembers are inefficient." CCTW believes authentication should be triggered by asking a survivor one of his four authenticator questions. Even though his procedures will compromise an authentication question, it will authenticate the SAR forces to the downed crewmember.

The bottom line is that through the experimentation process, many SAR units have devised their own authentication procedures which they might use in a real world conflict. These procedures do not match the procedures which crewmembers are taught at unit level. Therefore, aircrews and aircrew instructors must recognize that even though there has not been an official change to AFR 64-3 procedures, several variations do exist. If we go to war and a crewmember finds himself authenticating to SAR forces, he must prepare himself for SAR procedure variations. Additionally, if he doubts the authenticity of SAR he can reverse the SAR procedure. ★

Air Force Capt. William A. Ross holds a Masters degree in Management Science from the Harper School of Management, SUNY Binghamton, and a Bachelor's degree in Political Science from Catholic University, Washington, D.C. Ross has been a USAF intelligence officer since 1977. He is currently a collection management officer/team chief specializing in Central America.

by Salley Schaper

Improved APS-94F

"Bravo Zulu Three Four, group of five Mike Tango India. Grid coordinates Papa Charlie 314678 at 1343 Zulu, on secondary road."

To move his troops a tactical commander must have accurate information concerning the enemy's position. One of the best "eyes" he has is the Side Looking Airborne Radar mounted on an OV-1 Mohawk. An improved version of the AN/APS-94F model SLAR is currently undergoing tests at the Electronic Proving Ground, Fort Huachuca, Ariz.

The anti-jamming capabilities have been updated, and there's been improvements in range. The new model can pick up targets far beyond battle area. Also, there has been an updating of the data link to the ground.

The SLAR is a fixed-beam radar with an antenna mounted on the aircraft. The radar sends out a narrow beam at low angle to the earth's surface as the aircraft advances. The beam, which is transmitted in pulses, strikes, "targets" and reflects back to the antenna. The return signal is then converted to a radar map of the terrain similar to a photograph.

The radar is also able to detect moving objects. Use of the moving target indicators is a great asset to a tactical commander. The system can see targets in all types of light and various weather conditions. Commanders are able to observe the movement of forces or targets within a given radar range.

The SLAR is not only an essential tool for the tactical commander, it has also been used on several civilian-related missions. It provided vital information to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers on environmental evaluations, and produced important imagery of the volcanic activity on Mount St. Helens.

USAICS Training Support Company Activated

by Billy R. Shepherd

The United States Army Intelligence Center and Shool activated its newest company April 1. The Training Support Company, Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence (CEWI), was officially welcomed into the Intelligence Center and School on April 13 with a formal activation ceremony.

"Our job," explained Capt. Brad T. Andrew, commander of the Training Support Company, "is to support training missions, concept testings and equipment testing missions."

Organized as a scaled-down CEWI battalion, Andrew says, TSC will save the Army money and have a large impact in the military intelligence field.

"For example," Andrew said, "in the future, we'll have equipment and trained personnel, which will help get our training at the Intelligence Center and School out of the classroom and into the field.

"Previously, most military intelligence soldiers were getting classroom instruction and had not been exposed to any hands-on training," Andrew continued. "That puts a lot of pressure on the (permanent party) units to train soldiers."

Not only will personnel training in the military intelligence field be improved, but concept and equipment testing will also change. The Intelligence and Security Board is the developer of military intelligence systems, and once they develop the equipment, they have to find a tactical unit to test it.

This means, first they must train that unit's soldiers on the equipment, oversee the testing and then evaluate the feedback. But, with TSC here that process could be much quicker.

"This is something everyone has desired because it's hard to get feedback quickly if you have to travel to Europe," Andrew stated. "Of course, not everything can be worked out here but at least the initial problems can."

The Training Support Company is expected to reach its full strength in October or November of this year. It will be authorized 173 soldiers. "A lot of soldiers are calling because they want to be assigned here to help develop our abilities in the intelligence field," Andrew claimed.

Volunteers for TSC must have at least 12 months retainability at Fort Huachuca and be released from their present duty assignment. Qualified personnel are encouraged to contact Andrew or SFC Richard A. Sampson, company first sergeant, at 538-5686.

Sixth US Army Intelligence Training Army Area School

The Sixth US Army Intelligence Training Army Area School (6A ITAAS) will be operational at Los Alamitos Armed Reserve Center (AFRC), Los Alamitos, California, during the period of 11 June through 24 August 1984. Actual classroom instruction will begin on Monday, 24 June 1984, and end on Friday, 17 August 1984.

The school teaches the following courses: Tactical Intelligence Officer's Course (SSI 35A); Intelligence Analyst (MOS 96B, 964A); Counterintelligence Officer/Technician/Agent (SSI/MOS 36A, 971A, 97B); Interrogator (MOS 96C, 973A); S-2 Combat Operations; Security Management and Communication Security Custodian.

Point of Contact at Sixth US Army Headquarters is Jean LaTour, Autovon 586-3114/5056 or COMMERICAL (415) 561-3114/5056. To obtain quotas, contact Jean LaTour or SGT Kate Sheridan at the above telephone numbers.

OPFOR EW/REC Detachment

One of the NTC's most unique units is the Opposing Forces' Electronic Warfare/Radio Electronic Combat Detachment. The detachment was formed in October 1981 and supports both unit rotations and joint service exercise held at Fort Irwin.

The detachment is part of Company B, NTC, and is commanded by Capt. Ron Greer. The unit's top NCO is MSgt. William Garmon. Personnel in the detachment are mostly intelligence and combat support MOSs, including 17K, 05B, 05G, 33S, 64C and 98C.

Equipment includes XM330s and XM834s used to simulate Soviet jammers, OG181 (Piranha) jammers, and Watkins-Johnson 8975 direction finders. The detachment supports by conducting ground to air jamming against both Blue and Red air support, ground to ground jamming in support of the OPFOR, and intercept/-direction finding in support of the OPFOR. The detachment also has ground surveillance radar teams which directly support the OPFOR S2s, and tactical ground radar threat acquisition simulators (GRETA) to train evasive activities to aircraft crews.

The detachment is always willing to help visiting MI units and has a modest electronic repair shop. When not busy winning the war, S2s are welcome to drop by for a friendly cup of coffee and compare notes with EW/REC.

USAICS Notes

De Lora Named Brigade Commander

After giving elementary school teaching a go, and deciding it wasn't for her, the new commander of 1st School Brigade, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., decided to give the Army a try.

Col. Jo Ann De Lora joined the Army 20 years ago "with no intention of making it a career," she said. She now commands a battalion of permanent party personnel at ICS and a battalion of students attending the school.

According to Col. Marc B. Powe, military intelligence assignment manager, Colonels Division, U.S. Army MILPERCEN, she is the first female commander of the brigade and is the only full colonel female in MI.

The 42-year-old California native graduated from Chaffey High School, Ontario, Calif., in June 1959 and attended Chaffey College, a junior college at Alta Loma, Calif., from Sept. 1959 to June 1961. She was a music major until the last semester when she switched her major, because of a lack of music teaching jobs, to earn an Associate of Arts degree in foreign languages (French and German).

She then attended the University of California at Riverside, and graduated with a degree in French literature in June 1963. "I have always been interested in foreign languages," she said. "I took French and Spanish in high school also."

Prior to joining the Army, she was an elementary school teacher intern. "I liked teaching, but not the administrative structure," she said, "so I quit."

She decided to join the Army because it offered foreign area specialist training. Because she had long been interested in Chinese art, culture and philosophy, she wanted to learn more about that country.

Certain Army education requirements and assignments had to be met before she could qualify for the special training, she said. This included three years of troop duty, a branch advance course and a staff assignment.

De Lora received a direct commission as a reserve second lieutenant immediately before attending the Women's Army Corps officer basic course in 1964 at the WAC Training Center at Fort McClellan, Ala. At the completion of the course, she was assigned first as a platoon officer in a basic training company for six months and for another six months as assistant S3 at the WAC Training Battalion, WAC Training Center, Fort McClellan.

In 1965, she took command of the WAC Detachment at Fort McPherson, Ga., as a second lieutenant and left that assignment as a captain in 1967. Following that she attended the Adjutant General Advanced Course at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind., until May 1968 and was assigned at the U.S. Army Personnel Center, Oakland, Calif.

De Lora was accepted in the FAST training program in 1967, but did not begin training until January 1970. She was assigned to the Defense Language School in Monterey, Calif., where she was finally able to learn the Chinese language.

She then attended the American Embassy School of Chinese Language and Art Studies in Taichung, Taiwan, where she studied Mandarin Chinese from January 1971 to July 1972. "This was memorable for me, because, while stationed there, I was able to live among the Chinese people and travel all around Taiwan without ever speaking English. For days I went without a thought in English," she said.

"I was also able to visit most of the countries bordering China. The Chinese have a positive attitude, are outgoing to the point of being noisy, are hardworking and are a very sociable people." she said.

Upon completion of the school, she attended the University of Hawaii for graduate training in area studies on China and then served a utilization tour at the Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C., with the Estimates Directorate. There, she was an analyst in Chinese foreign relations and internal politics for three years.

She attended the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan., from 1977 to 1978 and was a Chinese instructor at West Point from July 1978 to July 1982. The last two years at West Point she was chief of the Chinese instructional group and was involved in a working group on integration of men and women at the Military Academy.

De Lora was chosen to attend the National War College from August 1982 to June 1983 and after graduating was again assigned to DIA in charge of the Chinese Branch, Eastern Division Research Directorate, located at Arlington Hall Station, Va.

She said she received her lieutenant colonel rank Sept. 1, 1977, and her colonel rank Sept. 1, 1983. "September 1 is also my birthday," she said, "so those were great birthday presents."

In addition to these accomplishments, De Lora learned how to fly an airplane while stationed at Fort Leavenworth in 1978. But because of weather conditions, she said, she could not log enough hours for her pilot's license. She plans to try for her license while stationed at Fort Huachuca.

USAISD Notes

USAITB—Soldiering in the Newest MI Battalion in the U.S. Army

A relatively small military organization separated from its command headquarters by over 2,000 miles must hold numerous distinctions. The U.S Army Intelligence Training Battalion at Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas, a subordinate of the Intelligence School at Fort Devens, Mass., is such a unit. This military organization is not only the newest MI training battalion in the U.S. Army, but the cadre and trainers have also gained prominence in setting the tone for soldierization—the development of soldiers.

The early history and growth of this Army unit garrisoned on Goodfellow AFB corresponds with the realignment of technical training furnished to the soldier.

Following the implementation of consolidated tri-service training at Goodfellow's Crypotologic School, the Army contingent was officially activated on March 25, 1966 by the U.S. Army Security Agency TRaining Center and School at Fort Devens. Designated as Goodfellow Detachment, USASATC&S, the organization began with an authorized strength of only one officer, one warrant officer, and 23 enlisted members. The new unit provided operational support to newly assigned Army personnel. By mid-April, Army cadre were on base, and intercept/translator skills training of soldier trainees had begun.

September 1975 brought further consolidation of training. Both the radio communications analysis and cryptanalysis courses were transferred from USASATC&S, Fort Devens, to Goodfellow AFB. As a result, the training of Army personnel increased dramatically, which in turn expanded the administrative workload of the Army detachment that supported the enlarged student population.

Mid-1976 marked the beginning of Army trainees, both maintenance and operator specialties, entering the STREAMLINER automated communications system training at the Goodfellow AFB Cryptologic School.

Resubordination occured Oct. 1, 1976 when the Goodfellow Detachment, USASATC&S, became the Goodfellow Detachment, U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens. This change was brought about by the USASATC&S being transferred from the former Army Security Agency to the Army Training and Doctrine Command.

During August 1977, further development of the tri-service training concept resulted in the transfer of radio teletype analysis training from the USAISD to Goodfellow; this again expanded the realm of technical training for soldiers attending the Cryptologic School.

Effective June 1, 1983, the Goodfellow Detachment, USAISD, was elevated to battalion level and redesignated the U.S. Army Intelligence Training Battalion (Provisional). This recorganization was needed to establish a more effective operational structure, one which improved command and supervision of the 420 students on board each month. As a result, the increased efficiency of personnel managment reduced the administrative demands of battalion cadre while improving the personnel support services to both the permanent party and student population. By October 5, the unit had been converted to a permanent battalion, with an authorized strength of four officers, three warrant officers and 147 enlisted members.

The restructuring into battalion operational elements created a headquarters section and two companies, A and B. Assignment of personnel, both permanent party and student, is based primarily upon the MOS classification of each service member. Company A has 98C, 05H and liaison personnel assigned and battalion cadre attached. Company B is composed of 98G, 72G, 34F and 31J personnel. Each company provides personnel management and administrative support to all assigned and attached members. Within the battalion headquarters, a staff composed of an S1, S2, S3 and S4 advises and assists the commander on matters within the command.

The newly formed USAITB is charged with the mission of providing:

- Command, control, administrative and logistical support for all assigned and attached personnel:

Learning how to apply facial camouflage is part of the FTX.

- Technical instructors under operational control of the 3480th Technical Training Group, U.S. Air Force, for the conduct of radio telephone intercept, traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, enciphered communications analysis, advanced morse identification techniques, and STREAMLINER operator/maintenance training:
- Soldierization training for all students. Daily activities in the battalion revolve around the training of soldiers in both technical and basic soldiering skills The USAITB training prepares the soldier for job performance and for supporting worldwide field missions of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command.

Physical training is a part of the USAITB Training Program. LTC Brian C. Warren, Battalion Commander, leads the biweekly Battalion "Fun Run".

Over 90 percent of the soldiers who receive technical training attend either the electronic warfare/signal intelligence analyst or EW/SIGINT voice interceptor courses on instruction. The Army unique EW/SIGINT analyst course is 15 weeks, two days in length. Personnel attending this training program arrive at the unit immediately following completion of basic combat training. Once in the classroom, the students' ability to perform basic analysis is rapidly developed.

For those attending EW/SIGINT voice interceptor training, there exists a wide range of programs, each of which prepares the student for performing collection and processing tasks while using a foreign language. Course lengths vary from four weeks to 16 weeks, three days. Unlike other personnel assigned for training purposes, Army trainees attending EW/SIGINT voice intercept training have been in uniform for quite some time. They arrive at the battalion after having completed extensive training at the Defense Language Institute, Presidio of Monterey, where proficiency in the target language has been gained. Using the latest in field related data, instructors guide the students in building proficiency in both the linguistic and technical aspects of their future duties. At Goodfellow Cryptologic School, noncommissioned officer trainers instill those skills necessary for the student to perform effectively in the field.

Upon successful completion of training, Army graduates are sent to either the U.S. Army Intelligence School for additional training or to their permanent assignment at an INSCOM or other tactical unit. Selected graduates of the EW/SIGINT analyst course, on occasion, receive an assignment to the Defense Language Institute for language training.

For the USAITB, it is no longer enough to focus upon sending to the field graduates who are capable of performing their technical job tasks. Military intelligence units, whether strategic or tactical, need **soldiers.** To develop basic soldiering skills, the

Handling POWs and interrogation techniques are part of the FTX.

Long hours put in during the exercise take their toll in various ways.

USAITB places soldierization training at the forefront of even the most routine training activity. Although this operational direction continues to be set by the commander, it is through sergeants' business, the noncommissioned officers of the unit, that the vast majority of these soldierization plans and programs are being carried out.

While attending technical training, Army students encounter a wide range of everyday soldiering activities—individual accountability for military conduct, daily participation in physical readiness training, marching in formation, etc. Following successful completion of this formal technical training, the trainees deploy to a field training area, where, for 36 hours, they receive instruction and participate in a variety of both technical and combat scenarios. This tactical training includes setting up a GP medium tent, a five-mile forced march with ambushes, establishment of TOC operations, combat and recon patroling, platoon defensive operations, and much more. In addition, during this tactical training, students receive instruction and are tested on 28 basic tasks selected from the SMART manual, including POW handling, land navigation, combat intelligence, CEOI and radio telephone operations, and others.

The USAITB, MI's newest training battalion, is meeting the challenges of today's changing Army. The cadre and trainers of this battalion are, in a short time, developing soldier trainees who will become proficient, both tactically and technically, military intelligence professionals who will move from classroom basics to ongoing collection, processing and reporting missions worldwide. ★

The CMF 33 Restructure

by CWO 2 Richard C. Bottis

The Career Management Field 33 restructure. What is it? How did we get to where we are today? Why are we changing the present structure? What does it involve? When will it be implemented? How will it affect my unit? How will it affect my career? These are just a few of the many questions that must be on the minds of Electronic Warfare Intercept Systems Repairers (33S) and their commanders.

Prior to 1965, CMF 33 did not exist, however, the job the 33 soldier performs certainly did and was performed by soldiers from four Military Occupational Specialties. Two, General Intercept Equipment Repairman (286.1) and Terminal Intercept Equipment Repairman (286.2), fed a capper MOS, Intercept Equipment Repair Supervisor (286.6). The fourth MOS, Microbarographic Equipment Repairman (292.1), tracked separately and did not equate to any job we have today.

In 1965, these MOSs underwent a numbers change and CMF 33 was born. 286.1 became 33B, 286.2 became 33C, 286.6 became 33D, and 292.1 became 33E.

Another change took place in 1965 when the training responsibility for the Electronic Warfare (EW) equipment repairman (26K/283.1) was transferred to the United States Army Security Agency Training Center and School (USASATC&S). This MOS was subsequently absorbed into CMF 33 when it underwent a major revision in 1967, thus introducing EW into CMF 33.

In 1967, CMF 33 underwent a major change. This time they broke CMF 33 into seven MOSs. Four of these specialties were broken out into functional groupings of EW/Intercept systems equipment: Receivers (33C), Recorders (33D), Demultiplexers (33F), and Electronic Countermeasures/Directional Finding (ECM/DF) Systems (33G). These four MOSs were fed by the General Intercept Equipment Repairman (33B), and in turn fed a capper MOS, the EW/Intercept Equipment Supervisor (33Z). The seventh MOS, 33E, continued to track separately from the rest of the MOSs.

From 1969 through 1975 the CMF 33 remained unchanged with the exception of MOSs 33B and 33E. In 1969, the 102-33B course ceased being an MOS-producing course and became instead a prerequisite for the journeyman level 33 series MOS courses. The 33B and 33E MOSs were deleted form the CMF in 1970. The 102-F10 Basic Electronic Maintenance Course became the prerequisite for entry into any of CMF 33 MOS producing courses.

A number of problems surfaced during the early 1970s, not the least of which was the inability of the Army to adequately fill intelligence units with the proper MOSs revision in 1967, thus introducing EW into (33C, 33D, 33F, or 33G). Quite often, the CMF 33 soldier was called upon to work outside his designated specialty.

A team was established in 1975 at the USASATC&S, Fort Devens, to seek solutions to these problems. The result was what the Army has today: the single MOS, 33S, EW/Intercept Systems Repairer. Equipment was taken from the four functional groupings of EW/Intercept equipment and either integrated into entry level training, placed in functional or annex courses (some of which granted additional skill indentifiers), or deleted from training altogether.

The problem was solved . . . or was it? The 33S was the best trained electronic technician the Army had to offer. He was qualified to work on all types of equipment, both strategic and tactical. If he required additional training, he went through one of the functional courses. The Army had a super mechanic, the 33S.

Things were looking good . . . on the surface at least. Underneath were a number of serious problems. USAISD was unable to publish a valid and equitable SQT on such a diversified MOS. The Department of the Army had as hard a time managing additional skill identifiers as it had managing the four MOSs. In addition, the ensuing explosion in the electronics field had a tremendous impact on the Sigint/EW equipment at both tactical and strategic sites.

As a result of this explosion, the 33S became responsible for more than 2,500 diversified pieces of electronic equipment, and the number of ASIs increased to 13, with more expected as a result of new systems being fielded. With these new and even more pervasive difficulties, the 33S soldier was not able to be as proficient as hoped. Another problem of grave concern was the retention rate



Figure 1

of 33S personnel. The training the 33S received, together with the experience he obtained during his tour of duty, was very marketable in the civilian community. These problems and complaints from the field prompted USAISD to conduct an internal evaluation of MOS 33S in early 1979. This evaluation identified the need for a comprehensive analysis of the CMF.

In late 1979, Eagle Technology Inc. of Arlington, Virginia, was awarded a contract to perform an occupational job and task analysis of CMF 33. In October 1981, an in-process review board (composed of representives from National Security Agency, U.S. Army Intelligence School Fort Devens, Intelligence and Security Command, Forces Command, Research and Development Command, U.S. Army Europe, and others) evaluated the contractors' proposals to restructure CMF 33 along one of the three models.

The model selected broke the CMF into five specialties plus a capper MOS. The contractors used the selected model to further develop CMF 33 jobs and tasks. The contractors

also developed a transition plan for the new structure, and delivered the final package to USAISD in October 1982. The responsibility to further develop the proposal fell on USAISD.

Developing an entire course of instruction for an MOS restructure is no simple matter. Upon examination, the scope of this undertaking is staggering. Eight programs of instruction; 1,400 lesson plans; tests; student handouts; 17 skill qualification tests; and associated soldiers' manuals, job books and training guides had to be developed. TRADOC Regulation 350-7, Training (A Systems Approach to Training), together with TRADOC Pamphlet 350-30, Interservice Procedures for Instructional Development, govern the development of instruction.

That's what was involved in the 33 CMF restructure, and here's where we are today:

The restructure proposal was approved by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel on January 5, 1984. As a result, reclassification of all 33S soldiers will take place during the month of March 1985. USAISD will implement four of the new AIT courses during 1st Quarter of Fiscal Year 1985 with the merger course being implemented during the 3rd Quarter of Fiscal Year 1985. Two new basic technical courses are scheduled to start in October 1985.

MILPERCEN, together with the CMF 33 proponent, will convene a technical board to ensure that all critical reclassification factors are considered in the decision process. Board members will review each soldier's records and carefully evaluate experience, job performance, grade, personal desires, training (functional course training, manufacturer training, and training provided by on-site maintenance teams), and the needs of the Army. Personnel reclassification will be conducted by MILPERCEN during this period. Additional information on reclassification will be coming when MILPERCEN publishes its letter of notification.

The tactical/strategic split legitimizes reality (for example, 33s at field stations differ from 33s in CEWI battalions). To reduce the number of ASIs and alleviate some of the management problems, equipment presently taught in functional and annex courses will be integrated into MOS producing courses. Reducing the amount of equipment responsibility will allow the CMF 33 soldier to concentrate on increasing his proficiency level. This increases in proficiency should also increase job satisfaction and improve retention of first and later term soldiers. The big plus for the user is that experience gained at one assignment can be transferred to subsequent assignments with little or no on the job training.

As the proponent for CMF 33, USAISD will be able to train the CMF 33 soldier to a better defined standard, instead of training to cover all maintenance contingencies. It will allow the school to recommend incentives (such as enlistment and reenlistment bonuses) to support the tactical force, and allow 33Ss with a preference for tactical or strategic assigments to choose the field that suits them best.

The restructure is not the ultimate solution to the problem. With state-of-the-art technology changing daily, the line has to be drawn somewhere. It is hoped that the design of these new courses will allow changes to be made without having to restructure the entire CMF.

The USAISD Maintenance Training Department is designing the five MOS producing courses right now. Input is needed and would be greatly appreciated, particularly in the development of strategic level courses. ★

Officers' Notes

Junior Officer Cryptologic Career Program

The National Security Agency/Central Security Service established the Junior Officer Cryptologic Career Program in June 1971 to broaden the cryptologic skills and management practices of junior officers. The three-year program is an excellent opportunity for career-oriented signals intelligence/electronic warfare officers to prepare for future leadership roles in cryptologic assignments. Officers who complete the program are awarded additional skill identifier 3W.

The JOCCP consists of a combination of schooling and familiarization assignments at the highest levels of the cryptologic community at NSA/CSS, Fort Meade, Md. Participants enroll in approximately 1,000 hours of instruction in signals analysis, technical support writing and computer sciences at the National Cryptologic School. Additionally, officers participate in a series of individually tailored assignments in various locations throughout NSA/CSS to develop an understanding of roles, missions and relationships, and gain experience in cryptologic skills.

Junior officers who hold specialty code 37, SIGINT/EW, as an initial specialty, have a bachelor's degree and who are a graduate of the MI Officer Advanced Course are eligible to apply. Applicants must have demonstrated outstanding performance and potential in previous assignments. Officers who apply must be available for a three-year tour at NSA/CSS, Fort Meade.

Interested eligible officers should write a letter of application which includes date of rank, specialty, years in service and availability date. Applicants should provide a brief summary of military background and a statement of career objectives in the cryptologic field. Letters of recommendation may be included, but are not required. The application should be sent to Commander, MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-OPF-M, 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, Va. 22332.

Selection for the JOCCP is highly competitive. An average of only three or four MI officers enter the JOCCP each year. An informal panel within

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MI branch initially screens applications to ensure the eligibility criteria is met. The JOCCP panel at NSA/CSS makes a final selection of participants from the list of eligible officers provided by MI branch.

Questions concerning the JOCCP should be directed to Maj. David J. Eggle, MI Professional Development Officer, Autovon 221-0143/0144.

Postgraduate Intelligence Program

The nine-month Postgraduate Intelligence Program, conducted twice a year by the Defense Intelligence College, is one of the several special purpose programs available for company grade military intelligence officers, warrant officers and senior civilians. MI branch is alloted 35 to 40 spaces each fiscal year for officers to attend.

Officers often ask to attend PGIP in lieu of the MI Officer Advanced Course, believing that the two courses are equivalent. Actually, they are different. A major part of the current MIOAC curriculum deals with emerging Army intelligence doctrine, systems and organizations. Significant portions of MIOAC are designed to bring officers from three different specialties (35, 36 and 37) to the same level of understanding in all three specialties. The emphasis is on Army intelligence in a tactical environment. An MI officer must successfully complete MIOBC to be considered initial specialty qualified. On the other hand, PGIP is for the mid-level intelligence professionals, military or civilian, of any DoD service or agency. The curriculum emphasizes national policy and strategic intelligence in a joint environment. It is designed to produce a strategic intelligence perspective. The criteria for attendance at PGIP is not always understood. Potential attendees are selected against the following criteria:

- hold 35 code as the initial specialty;
- be a company grade officer and have not attended the resident MIOAC;
- possess a bachelor's degree;
- have a final top secret security clearance with access to special certified intelligence;
- possess a strong tactical intelligence background;
- be a graduate of nonresident MIOAC prior to acceptance for entry; and
- be eligible for assignment to strategic intelligence (35B) positions worldwide.

Many MI company grade officers do not meet the narrow criteria for PGIP. Disapproval of any application does not reflect adversely on the applicant. Some meet the basic criteria, but cannot be selected for other pertinent reasons. A "strong tactical intelligence background" is generally defined as at least three years at corps level and below and experience in more than one intelligence position. Few branch transferees are selected for PGIP as the resident MIOAC provides a broader view of the Army intelligence and better enables the officers to catch up with his or her peers.

From the Army point of view, PGIP is a means to prepare an officer for a 35B position. However, due to limited requirements, PGIP is neither required nor mandatory prior to a 35B assignment.

To apply, officers must submit an informal letter to MI branch prior to 30 January for either the September or December class. Selection results are published during the last week in February. If selected, the officer's availability for reassignment will determine which PGIP class he or she will attend. Recommendations or indorsements from the chain of command are desired but not mandatory. An officer should include a brief synopsis of SC 35 experience and status regarding completion of MIOAC by correspondence. PGIP applications will be considered by a board composed of officers assigned to the MI branch.

PGIP students, who obtain approval, may participate in the Defense Intelligence College cooperative degree program to obtain a Master of Science degree in strategic intelligence. The MSSI program provides a graduate level program of study in the principles, operations and management of strategic intelligence. PGIP students selected to participate in the cooperative program will perform MSSI work concurrently with the PGIP. Cooperative degree participants normally complete the MSSI requirements after the PGIP graduation date. Participants who are assigned to the Washington, D.C., area will complete the MSSI within one year at their new assignment. Officers assigned out of the National Capitol Region may be eligible to remain approximately three months after normal PGIP graduation to complete the degree, depending upon their assignment report date. PGIP students who desire to participate in the MSSI program are required to obtain prior approval from MI branch.

Questions concerning PGIP should be directed to Maj. David J. Eggle, MI Professional Development Officer, Autovon 221-0143/0144.

The application should be sent to Commander, MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-OPF-M, 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, Va. 22332.

Defense Advanced Language and Area Studies Program

The General Defense Intelligence Program has opportunities for full-time study of Third World areas and languages during academic year 1984-85. This program was established within the Defense Intelligence Agency which recognized the need for linguists and specialists within DIA and the services.

The language and Area Studies Program is designed to emphasize language and area specializations for restive regions of Africa, Middle East/Southwest Asia, South and Southeast Asia, and Latin America.

Individuals applying for the program must hold and be fully qualified in military intelligence specialties 35 or 36, be a warrant officer holding 96X or 97X series MOS, or be a foreign area officer qualified in or working toward qualification in the geographic area selected for study. Applicants must acknowledge that if accepted into the program, they will incur a three-for-one service obligation in accordance with AR 621-7.

Interested officers can obtain additional information concerning program requirements and application procedures by contacting Maj. David J. Eggle, MI branch Professional Development Officer, Autovon 221-0143/0144.

OPMF: the Officer's Key to Selection

One of the most important resources used by Department of the Army selection boards and career managers in the evaluation of officers is the

Official Military Personnel File. Everyone understands the importance of having up-to-date information reviewed by those making important decisions on careers; however, many officers continue to wait until the last few months and weeks before boards meet to ensure their OMPF is complete and accurate. The purpose of this article is to discuss the OMPF and provide information which will reduce needless anxiety for officers as they come into various zones of consideration.

The OMPF is comprised of a performance (P) fiche, service (S) fiche, and restricted (R) fiche. The P fiche is that section of the OMPF used for filing performance, commendatory, and disciplinary data. Routinely used by career managers and selection boards, documents are limited to those related to a member's demonstrated performance, such as evaluation reports, awards, letters of appreciation, courts martial, Article 15s, etc. Documents are added to the OMPF as they are received by the custodian. If more than one document is received at the same time, they are filed in chronological order.

The service (S) fiche is the section of the OMPF where general information and service data are filed. Normally not viewed by selection boards, it is routinely used by career managers. Documents on this fiche are those that must be kept permanently to historically record service and protect the interest of both the member and the Army, such as accession information, promotion orders, regular Army appointments, etc.

The restricted (R) fiche is the OMPF section for historical data that may be biased against the member when viewed by selection boards or career managers. Because of its content, it will not be released to selection boards without written approval from the Director of Military Personnel Management, DA DCSPER, or HQDA selection board proponent as outlined in AR 640-10, dated Sept. 1, 1983. Examples of documents filed in the R fiche are appellate actions, investigations, and other items not authorized for file on the P or S fiche which maintain an unbroken historical record of a member's service, conduct, duty performance, evaluation periods, and corrections to other parts of the OMPF.

With this general background concerning the composition of the OMPF in mind, let's consider the actual documents to be filed. When documents are received for filing in the OMPF, they are reviewed to determine whether or not they are authorized to be included. Chapter 4, AR 640-10, effective Sept. 1, 1983, contains detailed guidance concerning documents authorized in the OMPF. As such, it is recommended that service members become acquainted with this regulation. Some of the most common documents which are **not** authorized for file in the OMPF are:

- Letters of commendation/appreciation which do not have a statement in the body of the correspondence or indorsement directing file in the OMPF. Also letters which are not addressed to the member or where the member's name is not referenced in the text.
- Certificates (resident/nonresident) for courses/programs of study by schools not listed in AR 351-1, appendices B, C, and D or DA Pam 351-4, appendices A or B. In addition, these documents will not be filed if an academic report is issued.
- College transcripts. The DA Form 1059-1 (Civilian Institution Academic Evaluation Report) will be the only document placed in the OMPF to reflect civilian education level changes. The only exception to this policy is for JAG, chaplain and AMEDD personnel. Transcripts and/or diplomas will be maintained only by management divisions in Career Management Individual Files.
- Photographs. Effective Jan. 1, 1984, photos will no longer be filmed on the OMPF. Instead, they will be maintained in the CMIF and viewed by selection boards in hard copy.

Once placed in the OMPF, a document becomes a permanent part of the file. Documents authorized for file under previous versions of AR 640-10, but no longer authorized, will remain on the OMPF unless removal or movement to another part of the OMPF is directed by appropriate authority, such as the Army Board for Correction of Military Records, the Department of the Army Suitability Evaluation Board, or the MILPERCEN Appeals and Corrections Branch.

It is important to point out that each new version of AR 640-10 since conversion of the OMPF from paper to microfiche has made strides in reducing "clutter" and duplication. The most obvious misconception officers have is that the more letters, certificates and other extraneous data there is in the OMPF, the better their file will look. This is not true. As addressed repeatedly in board comments, in some cases when carried to extreme, such material may actually be a detriment. Officers should pick and choose carefully documents they want included in the OMPF. Documents filed today may not seem as important several years from now when that file is considered for promotion to senior grades. File updating is keyed to the efficiency report. Other documents such as award orders, citations and promotion orders, are held until an evaluation report triggers the filming process. Where selection boards are concerned, photos, as previously mentioned, are reviewed in hard copy, along with documents such as evaluation reports and other "loose papers" that have been received prior to the board date but have yet to be filmed.

The information provided has been directed at developing an understanding of OMPF makeup and policy. With this information, it is hoped that officers may better prepare themselves for consideration by various selection boards. In this regard, each officer should review his or her OMPF annually to ensure proper followup and posting of various documents on the OMPF. OMPF information and copies of the OMPF can be obtained at no charge by writing to the Commander, USA MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-MSR-S, 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, Va. 22332.

Due to Privacy Act restrictions, all requests for copies of the OMPF must be in writing and include member's name, grade, SSN, mailing address, and signature. In addition, if desired, an officer who plans to be in the Washington, D.C., area may make an appointment to review his or her OMPF in person in Room 5N43, Hoffman II, by contacting the same address or calling Autovon 221, commercial (202) 325-9618/19. A code-a-phone service is used after normal duty hours to facilitate appointment service. ★

Enlisted Notes

The Promotion Board Mystique

by David E. Gregory

During a soldier's career, few events affect his life, personally and professionally, as much as a promotion selection board. Yet the actual process of selection remains a mystery to the average noncommissioned officer. To understand the selection board process a little better, let's look behind the scenes at a selection board and see how selections are made and what a soldier can do to improve his or her chances for promotion.

Since June 1, 1970, selections for promotion to grades E7 through E9 have been made through the Department of the Army centralized selection board process. This system relies completely on information from the soldier's Official Military Personnel File and his Personnel Qualification Record (DA Form 2A and 2-1). It is vitally important that these items be up-to-date and accurate. The soldier must review his or her file periodically to make sure it is correct.

Enlisted selection boards are convened by Headquarters, Department of the Army and held at the U.S. Army Enlisted Records and Evaluation Center, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind. Before a board meets, there are a number of steps EREC must take to prepare for it. We will discuss these steps, as well as what happens while the selection board is meeting and after it adjourns.

Approximately four months before a selection board convenes, HQDA announces primary and secondary zones of consideration for soldiers eligible for promotion. These zones include date of rank, basic service data, and any special requirements necessary for eligibility. When EREC receives the message announcing the zones of consideration, preparations for the upcoming selection board begin.

From the Enlisted Master File, EREC produces an initial computer list of names of eligible soldiers. This computer tape is checked against several other sources to ensure its accuracy: the OMPF, the Joint Uniform Military Pay System files, the list of deserters provided by the U.S. Army Deserter Information Point at EREC, the separation records that EREC maintains, and the Board Edit File, which contains the names of soldiers already selected by previous boards for promotion or schooling.

EREC also checks soldiers' files to determine if any official photos or Senior Enlisted Evaluation Reports are missing. Messages are then sent to all major commands and military personnel offices worldwide, listing soldiers in each command who are eligible for promotion consideration and requesting PQRs, EERs, or official photos for files that are not up-to-date.

Two months before the board begins, EREC checks the list of eligible soldiers against the JUMPS, deserter and separated soldiers' files again. MACOMs and MILPOs receive two more messages reminding them to submit mission PQRs, EERs, photos and height/weight data.

The final deadline to receive documentation from all agencies is normally 10 days before the board convenes. Up to the day before the selection board convenes, any documentation received prior to the last cutoff date is added to the soldier's file in hard copy form. EREC will process anything received from the field after this cutoff date, but will not place it in the soldier's file for review by the board.

Five days before the board, the EREC commander and division chiefs screen approximately 400 records, selected at random, to determine any problem areas and verify the general condition of the files.

A typical selection board is presided over by a major general, with nine brigadier general panel chiefs. Each panel concentrates on one or more career management fields, and consists of at least three people. A typical panel would have a brigadier general chief, and a colonel, a lieutenant colonel, and an E8 or E9 as members.

If a panel will be reviewing and voting on a very large number of records, it may have more than three members. Each panel also has a nonvoting NCO as panel recorder.

Two days before the selection board convenes, the board president arrives and is briefed on board structure, duties of the board, and requirements and procedures of the selection process. When the board members arrive, a representative of the Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, briefs them on the requirements and duties of the selection board. They familiarize themselves with the selection procedures and conduct practice votes.

During board deliberations, each soldier competes with all other soldiers in his or her zone of consideration by primary and progression MOS only.

The board members perform their duties in a large work area. Entry to this area is restricted to all but board members and selected EREC staff. Board members generally wear civilian clothes during selection board proceedings. By doing so, the members can perform their deliberations anonymously, and maintain the necessary security. Within the board room, heavy partitions separate the panels from each other. Panel members are seated together, and each has a work table with a microfiche reader to use in reviewing soldiers' records.

The board reviews three items; the performance portion (P-fiche) of the OMPF, the PQR, and all hard copy documents not on the OMPF. The first item a panel sees is normally the hard copy official military photograph of the NCO being considered. The soldier's appearance in the photo gives a very important first impression. A sloppy appearance, being overweight, or wearing unauthorized awards and decorations can reduce the soldier's chance for selection. A missing or outdated photo gives the impression that the soldier is trying to hide something or simply doesn't care.

At this point, board members generally have a cup of coffee and take a quick look at the History Data Report, which gives the NCO's EER scores

over a period of the last 60 rated months. This report shows trends such as consistently high or low scores and improved or erratic scores. After reviewing the History Data Report, the PQR (DA Forms 2A and 2-1) is evaluated. Form 2A is a computer printout which repeats some of the information found on the 2-1, but in a condensed format.

Both forms received close scrutiny for any discrepancies. Among the items shown on the Form 2A are soldier's present duty assignment, education, date of photograph, and physical profile. The board member also checks to see whether the soldier has signed the last page of the Form 2-1, verifying that he or she has reviewed the information and entered his or her correct height and weight.

Now the board member returns to the P-fiche of the OMPF, paying careful attention to the narrative section of the EER. The numerical scores give a general picture of the NCO's performance, but written comments from the rater and indorser tell the story of how the soldier performs his duties. Most important are the Duty Description (Part II) and Evaluation of Potential (Part IV) blocks.

Based on the three items reviewed (P-fiche, PQR, and hard copy documents), the board member will vote on the soldier's record, using a number from one to six. The numerical scoring method and importance of each number is shown in the illustration below.

A "+" or "-" is sometimes used to give further weight to a vote score. The number of points awarded a soldier's record is written on a scorecard. That score is not seen by the other two voting panel members until they vote.

Once the record is voted, the panel recorder checks the scores. If there is a variance of two or more points between the three voting panel members, the record goes back to each for another review. The third voting member may have found something overlooked by the other two, or vice versa. Records are rotated among panel members so a voting pattern will not be established by having the same members vote on the same records.

Based on the scores given by the voting members, the soldiers considered by a promotion selection board are listed by order of merit. Soldiers receiving the highest scores are generally considered "best qualified" for promotion. The selection board also recommends for promotion those soldiers from the secondary zone who are considered "outstandingly qualified."

The selection board also determines which soldiers should enter the Qualitative Management Program. QMP screens soldiers whose overall records merit a bar to reenlistment.

After the board adjourns, the list of NCOs recommended for promotion is again compared against JUMPS, deserter and separation files. This procedure takes about two weeks. During this time, the board recorder verifies the final results of the selection board, preparing lists of those individuals selected or not selected and comparing them against the order of merit list. When this action is complete, the final standings are forwarded to MILPERCEN. EREC then adds to the board edit files the names of those NCOs selected for promotion or schooling.

Before a selection board convenes, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel determines the number of soldiers to be promoted for each MOS and zone based on the number of soldiers in that specialty and grade compared to the number authorized Army-wide. For this reason, the number of promotions in "overage" MOSs is generally lower than that for "shortage" ones.

In the past, promotions were based on overall shortages in a career management field, but this method had its drawbacks since even a shortage field will have overage MOSs. Promotion by this method meant that soldiers in overage specialties were promoted as easily as those in shortage ones. This created an even greater disparity in the overage MOSs. Overstrength MOSs now receive the minimum number of promotion recommendations.

Restrictions are imposed on the promotion of soldiers in an overage MOS. Under these restrictions, selection boards can only recommend for promotion those soldiers who are the "best of the best." There are other options for soldiers to consider, though. Currently, the records of soldiers in overstrength MOSs are screened by selection boards with the intention of promoting them in other MOSs.

Reclassification is involuntary. An NCO selected for reclassification can decline promotion and try to get selected in his primary MOS the following year. NCOs are not selected or reclassified into MOSs for which they aren't qualified. The selection board must check the records against MOS prerequisites and training to ensure that both are met. When a soldier is considered for promotion in a secondary or other MOS, his or her experience in that skill is judged to determine whether he or she is qualified.

Because the Army seeks to increase the quality and professionalism of its soldiers, the competition for promotion is tougher than ever before. Soldiers owe it to themselves to ensure that their records are as accurate and up to date as possible. The rest is up to the selection board members. ★

Voting/Scoring System

Score	Sample Description
1	Substandard soldier, recommended for Qualitative Management Program.
2	Poor to fair, retain in service.
3	Good soldier, weak prospect.
4	Excellent soldier, moderate prospect.
5	Superior soldier, strong prospect.
6	Outstanding soldier, definite prospect.

PROFESSIONAL READER

The Third World in Soviet Military Thought by Mark N. Katz, Johns Hopkins Press, 1982, 188 pages, $18.50.

The Third World in Soviet Military Thought is the product of extensive though incomplete, analysis. The author's impressive research of Russian sources is offset by his incomplete consideration of the views of Marx and Lenin on peasant societal development. The result is a book that demonstrates impressively that the Soviets have paid close attention to the Third World, but one that offers a deficient analysis of this phenomenon.

Katz maintains that his purpose is to examine Soviet military thinking about conflict in the Third World and to demonstrate its evolution. He states that the greatest change has occurred in the Brezhnev era, but that to understand it properly, we must go back into history. Thus, Chapter I chronicles Soviet views during the Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev eras.

This is the book's first, though not its greatest, failing. Had he limited his study's title to only the Brezhnev era, then such a brief treatment of earlier periods might be more justified. As it is, the author does not discuss Marx in any detail, limits his discussion of Lenin and Stalin to four pages, and covers Khrushchev in 15 pages. Much is missed here, including Marx's theoretical as well as Soviet policy statements which would help Katz to answer some of the difficult questions that he poses in his Brezhnev discussion.

He separates the Brezhnev era into three chapters, which are entitled "The Early. . . ," "The Middle. . . ," and "The Late Brezhnev Years." This compartmentalization, while it gives the book a physical balance, is unfortunate because it subdivides the Brezhnev era artificially. This treatment minimizes the overall consistency in Soviet policy while it maximizes the opportunistic aspects of that policy. Katz infers that the middle evolved from the early and the late from the middle period. To some extent, this point is true: we all learn from our mistakes. But, this largely ignores the long-range aspects of Soviet strategy, which are at least as important as such tactical adjustments.

Katz then presents his modest conclusions, which are that Soviet military planning is reactive and could be changed by either Brezhnev's death or the success or failure of the present policy. He cautions that the U.S. can counter the Soviets by ceasing to dichotomize the Third World into communist versus pro-U.S. nations exercising more flexibility in our policy and encouraging moderation in the Third World dictatorships.

The book's major weaknesses are clearly not in research. Most of the research is extensive and is most impressive in Katz's investigation of Soviet formulations about the types of wars. Rather, the faults of the book are analytical and the following constitute the author's greatest problems:

First, Katz asserts but never proves that the Soviet military develops independent positions on strategic matters, viewpoints which clash with those of the Communist Party. This is a serious flaw because many works (for example, Graham Vernon's **Soviet Perceptions of War and Peace,** John Dziak's **Soviet Perceptions of Military Power,** and Harriet and William Scotts' **The Soviet Art of War,** argue convincingly that Soviet military statements evolve from, are subordinate to, and are in agreement with party policy. Katz is certainly free to disagree with this position, but he should explicitly recognize and refute it. Furthermore, the cases of military disagreement which he cites are often based on inference or conjecture; he frequently fails to prove his assertions in a convincing and empirical fashion.

Secondly, the author ignores significant evidence which supports the argument that there is both fundamental historical continuity and significant ideological motivation in Soviet policy toward the Third World. Among these statements are: Marx's discussions on the peasantry; Lenin's speech to Bolshevik activists on December 6, 1920, in which he implies that disputes in the Third World will be a major theme in 20th century international relations; and Karl Wittfogel's **Oriental Despotism,** which discusses Soviet strategy toward the Third World. Without providing a historical context, the Soviets appear to be myopic pragmatists who are doing their best to try to contend with a changing Third World. This underrates many impressive contributions by Soviet planners and permits the misinterpretation of purely tactical changes as major strategic shifts.

Third, Katz does not adequately understand the development of Soviet military power. Although he finally discusses the issue of correlation of forces on page 124 of his 167 page text, he cautions against an overemphasis of this Soviet concept. Had Katz examined Soviet military developments, he would have seen that the Soviets did not have a significant force projection capability before the 1970s, and, prior to then, they did all that they could—deliver arms. When the Soviet military finally fulfilled its strategic defense mission, it operated more actively in the Third World. As power projection forces were enhanced, the Soviets played an even greater role in Angola, Ethiopia and Afghanistan. If this trend continues, then we might see even greater Soviet involvement in the future.

However, Katz neither sees the possibility of this evolving trend nor forecasts its possible continuation. Rather, in deemphasizing the importance of Soviet ideology and Soviet weapons development, he is led to depict the Soviets as opportunists who are encountering increasingly greater Third World opposition. He believes that this opposition can thwart future Soviet successes in the Third World and calls upon the United States to encourage—and even support—this trend. I believe that Katz is much too optimistic, and that the prescription which he offers is not enough to stop Soviet expansion. Recent events in Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, Africa and Central America support the hypothesis that the Soviets intend to play an even more prominent role in the Third World in the future.

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On a Field of Red—The Communist International and the Coming of World War II by Anthony Cave Brown and Charles MacDonald, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1981, 718 pages, $19.95.

This book is a study about the establishment of the Communist International, the Comintern, and its relationship to the outbreak of World War II. One author is Anthony Cave Brown, a British journalist and the author of the **The Body of Lies,** which covers Allied deception operations in World War II. The other is Charles MacDonald, a retired United States Army historian and writer.

The book opens with a prologue and introductory chapter on the Russian Revolution in 1917 entitled **The Changing of the Guard.** Brown and MacDonald then review the fortunes of Lenin and his Bolshevik comrades, who returned from Western exile, seized power in Russia and established the Soviet state. The authors outline the tangled, hostile and bloody relationships between the Reds, the Whites, the Western Allies, the Central Powers and the new states in Central and Eastern Europe. While fighting for survival the Bolsheviks established the Communist International, the Comintern, in the Kremlin on March 2, 1919. From then on the Comintern plotted and worked for world revolution despite zigs and zags in the party line. The book concludes with a presentation on the policies of the Soviet Union and the Comintern relative to the outbreak of World War II and an epilogue on Soviet operations during and after the war.

The authors have engaged in a worthwhile research effort. They have had access to recently declassified information, including United States Military Intelligence records, the late Gen. William Donovan's Office of Strategic Services papers and Federal Bureau of Investigation and Central Intelligence Agency materials. Brown and MacDonald have developed their study on Soviet subversive political operations with a certain topical and chronological continuity. Despite these favorable aspects, the book unfortunately has numerous shortcomings.

The authors claim to base many of their assertions on official sources. Many statements are attributed actually to secondary works. Some extremely interesting revelations, on the other hand, are unclearly linked to sources or identified as to origin only in very general terms. Other comments are evidently derived from United States Military Intelligence reporting on or about statements from liaison sources rather than from the original reports. This technique causes confusion not only regarding the origins of the reports but about the information as well.

There are inaccuracies. The authors state, for example, that Guy Burgess was "seemingly securely ensconced in the British secret service" before World War II and later aided "Kim" Philby gain a post there. Burgess worked as a contact of the British Security Service (MI-5). He was a staff officer of Section D, the precursor of the British Special Operations Executive, for only a short period in the early days of World War II. This was long enough, however, for Burgess to assist Philby in obtaining a position in that organization. Philby transferred subsequently to the Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6). Anthony Blunt served as a captain in the Security Service. He was not in the SOE as the authors claim.

Brown and MacDonald have undertaken a praiseworthy task. The history of the Comintern

and its operations between the wars needs telling in an accurate and objective manner. Its activities relating to the outbreak of the war requires further clarification in the West. The authors become too involved, however, in such extraneous events as the British abdication crisis, the problems of the Duke of Windsor and other developments not directly germane to the subjects at hand. This study becomes so enmeshed in side issues that it unfortunately falls short of its purpose. This book is helpful therefore as an introduction to a fascinating subject and the historical materials presently available relating to it. The study does not achieve its objective covering **On a Field of Red.**

John H. Carroll

The Australian-American Security Relationship in Regional and International Perspective by Henry S. Albinski, St. Martin Press, 1982, 257 pages, $32.50.

Australians have gone to war only as allies, only overseas. In 1885 troops from the colony of New South Wales fought the dervishes in Sudan alongside the other British forces. At the turn of the 20th century soldiers from the six Australian colonies joined British forces suppressing the Boer revolt in South Africa. In World War I, one in every 20 Australians served overseas; two of every three became casualties in such famous engagements as Gallipoli. Australians fought with the United Nations in World War II and Korea, and joined the Americans in the Vietnam war.

The burgeoning Australian television and film exports have introduced millions of Americans, through artistic and entertaining interpretations, to Australia's military involvements. Films like *"Gallipoli"* and *"Breaker Morant,"* and the television series *"A Town Called Alice"* gives us an Aussie viewpoint of these historical alliances. Professor Albinski, an American scholar of contemporary U.S. - Australian relations, has written a detailed appraisal of defense relations during the Carter administration and the Fraser government from an American viewpoint. Albinski's tour d'horizon of U.S. - Australian security concerns indicates that Australia is definitely a middle-level, regional power, and the junior partner in this relation. Nevertheless, it is a bellweather of regional developments. For example, Australian attention was focused on Soviet involvement in the Indian Ocean before this penetration generated widespread interest in the United States. The United States and Australia subsequently have come to share a common concern regarding Soviet actions in Asia. They have also developed and coordinated their military capabilities in response to this Soviet challenge. Joint communications facilities at Pine Gap, Nurrungar, and the Northwest Cape help both countries to monitor and respond to Soviet Asian moves. The losses of similar facilities in Iran and Ethiopia and the subsequent impact of these losses on the verification of U.S. - Soviet SALT negotiations and on general U.S. defense policy underscores the value of Australia's stability and its close ties to the United States.

Defense ties between Australia and the United States grew and developed along with Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, the collapse of stability in Iran, and increased Western concern with oil routes in the Indian Ocean. Albinski's book presents a balanced account of this developing relationship. Whatever other marks the Carter administration might get for its foreign policy, relations with Australia may be counted as one of the high spots.

Scholars seeking details on these two countries' defense relations in the late 1970's will be well served by the careful and extensive research done by Professor Albinski. There is more detail here than is probably needed by the average military reader and the price tag is far too steep for impulse buying. These are liabilities rather than faults with the volume. Albinski's book helps the reader better understand these staunch allies "down under" by clarifying their dense policies. In the process, he helps us learn more about the workings of our own policy and our reliance on Australia.

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Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban by Glenn T. Seaborg, University of California Press, 1981, 320 pages, $16.95

Glenn T. Seaborg has written (with the assistance of Benjamin S. Loeb) an extremely insightful book on how the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed during the Kennedy Administration in 1963. Having served as the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Seaborg was in the unique position of having been at key meetings throughout the initial months of President Kennedy's Administration when the young president was placing a high priority on achieving some type of treaty with the Soviets on limiting nuclear weapons testing. Recollection of meetings and consultations between the Joint Chiefs of Staff, key Congressional leaders, Kennedy Administration officials, and diplomatic exchanges with Khrushchev make this book of great historical interest. Of primary concern to both supporters and opposers of a treaty was the clandestine nuclear testing by the Soviets. The intelligence community was of the opinion that any significant blasts would be detected. Therefore, verification via national technical means was of special importance. Following the Berlin crisis of 1961, and the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, both sides were interested in establishing some type of treaty, even if only a limited one.

The book is of historical interest not only to individuals who are interested in 20th century history, but of how intelligence and the reliability of collection means can effect national policy. "National technical means," that phrase used so frequently by negotiators during the SALT treaty talks, took on a special meaning in negotiating this treaty.

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The Warsaw Pact: Political Purpose and Military Means, edited by Robert W. Clawson and Lawrence S. Kaplan, Wilmington, Del., Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1982.

This book provides a concise collection of articles relevant to the study of the Warsaw Pact countries. It examines the dynamic aspects of the political and military relationships between the Pact nations and the Soviet Union.

The most obvious conclusion of the 14 authors is that Soviet and Warsaw Pact military strengths have increased dramatically since the Pact's inception in 1955. As a result of this military buildup, the authors conclude that if the Pact nations should fight, the weight of their forces could contribute significantly to Soviet military strength. This military escalation has been achieved, the book indicates, through the control which the Soviet Union directs as a result of the Pact agreements. Soviet leaders possess considerable authority over the economic, political, and military lives of the Warsaw Pact compatriots.

However, the most important question still remains unanswered. Will the Warsaw Pact nations cooperate with the Soviet Union in case of a war? Although a definitive answer to this question will probably not become known in peacetime, the authors of this volume present some serious points of conflict within the Soviet bloc. These problems include tensions caused by the fact that career military people receive special privileges and seem to be more loyal to Moscow than to the national governments of the Pact countries. Other conflicts arise from recurring economic crises, ethnic differences, and nationalism. Many of these are focused by the Brezhnev Doctrine of 1968 which states that the Soviet Union retains the right to intervene in the affairs of any Warsaw Pact nation for the good of the alliance. The influence of these factors will determine the actions of the Pact in case of war. Unfortunately, their effects cannot be measured.

In summary, this book is highly recommended. While it contains much information readily available from other sources, it serve two purposes. First, it provides a solid introduction to the political and military functions and capabilities of the Warsaw Pact nations. Second, its concise nature, well-defined articles, and plentiful reference tables make the book an excellent source of instant information.

2nd Lt. Robert D. McMichael

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U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School

HISTORY

by Dr. Bruce Saunders,
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Two central themes dominate the history of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School: centralization of training and an increasing concern for excellence in military intelligence. There are numerous events and many individuals that helped to move the center and school toward these two goals. One of the first events took place on Nov. 20, 1970, when the Chief of Staff of the Army, Gen. Harold K. Johnson, decided that Fort Huachuca would serve as the center for U.S. Army intelligence. The following year, a second major decision directed the relocation of the U.S. Army Intelligence School, formerly at Fort Holabird, Md., to Fort Huachuca. Additionally, the new Intelligence Center assumed duty as the integrating center for military intelligence and was directed to consolidate all MI training for the Army at a future date.

These decisions were based on the recommendations of the Norris Board, appointed by Johnson in 1966. The Norris Board recommended the consolidation of all MI activities within the Army. Johnson implemented that idea when, on July 1, 1967, he combined the Intelligence Corps and the Army Security Agency into a new branch, Military Intelligence. A consolidated branch with its own center and school would permit the centralization of training, manpower, and resources, and improve the exchange of ideas, concepts and training theories.

Space limitations at Fort Holabird were another reason for relocating the Intelligence School. There was no space for runway construction and the airspace near Fort Holabird was congested. The electromagnetic spectrum in and around Fort Holabird was contaminated with various types of interference. In contrast, Fort Huachuca occupied over 70,000 acres, had a 5,000 foot runway, uncongested airspace and an uncluttered electromagnetic spectrum that would allow the testing of various types of equipment.

The Intelligence School was officially renamed the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School in August 1971 when the move from Maryland to Arizona was completed. Two allied organizations joined USAICS in 1973. The U.S. Army Combat Developments Command Intelligence Agency became a part of USAICS in March 1973. Four months later, the U.S. Army Combat Surveillance and Electronic Warfare School further increased the size and importance of USAICS. The mission of USAICS expanded to include combat developments, intelligence training, doctrinal development, organizational study of equipment and materiel, and proponency for surveillance, target acquisition and night observation operations. With an expanded mission and the growth of training activities, USAICS gained authorization for a brigadier general as commander. Brig. Gen. Harry H. Heistand took command of USAICS on May 7, 1973.

Consolidation of Army intelligence training and the acquisition of new intelligence missions marked the first years of USAICS. The command became the primary training institution for tactical intelligence, counterintelligence, and target acquisition. Thirty-nine different academic courses were required to adequately train enlisted and officer students. A large portion of the MI courses were at Fort Huachuca, while training for ASA courses continued at Fort Devens, Mass. However, some major changes were underway.

The Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study significantly altered the direction and scope of MI. The report recommended further consolidation of intelligence training, and USAICS took control of the ASA school at Fort Devens, which then became the U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens. At the same time, USAICS assumed control of the Devens detachments, one at Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas, and the other at the Naval Technical Training Center, Corry Station, Fla. Although geographically separate, command and proponency for the four campuses was centered at Fort Huachuca, expanding the USAICS training mission to include counterintelligence, signals intelligence, combat intelligence, operational testing and electronic warfare.

The first Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence unit was formed at Fort Hood, Texas, in October 1976. The concept of a division and corps level all-source intelligence unit was realized with CEWI, and USAICS played a major role in its development. Like all MI organizations, the CEWI unit was to provide timely intelligence to the commander. To systematize this function, then-USAICS commander, Brig. Gen. Eugene Kelly, Jr., ordered the school's Directorate of Combat Developments to produce an automatic intelligence gathering process for all CEWI units. The process, known as Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, provided an evaluation of the enemy, weather and terrain while considering enemy doctrine for specific missions. Since 1975, USAICS has refined and tested the IPB concept and has included it in the current FM 34-1, "Intelligence Electronic Warfare Operations."

In 1982, during his tenure as USAICS commandant, Brig. Gen. Richard Wilmot ordered further consolidation of MI training by moving signals intelligence and electronic warfare officer courses from Fort Devens to Fort Huachuca. The move was completed in October 1982, under direction of the current USAICS commandant, Maj. Gen. Sydney T. Weinstein. Centralization of officer courses at Fort Huachuca was caused by a number of reasons. First, MILPERCEN forecasted a 1982 shortage of enlisted personnel in career management field 96. To provide more CMF 96 training slots at Fort Devens, the officer courses had to be moved. Also, the Review of Education and Training for Officers indicated the need for a new type of intelligence officer with a variety of skills, rather than one narrow specialization. RETO recommended all-source intelligence officer training; USAICS designed a 24-week course divided into a common skills module and a tactical all-source intelligence officer module. The new course, which premiered in October 1983, also included expanded instruction in leadership and ethics, and expanded field training exercises to train young officers for duties in the field.

The implementation of CEWI and IPB brought a need for sophisticated equipment. To assist in the development, use and maintenance of various types of equipment, the TRADOC commander appointed TRADOC Systems Managers over 30 major Army systems. When the TSM program started, USAICS had TSMs assigned for Special Electronic Mission Aircraft, Ground Tactical Electronic Warfare/Intelligence Systems, and Stand-Off Target Acquisition Systems. In 1981, TRADOC transferred the TSM for the All-Source Analysis System from the Combined Arms Center to USAICS. At the same time, the SOTAS TSM was eliminated because of a termination of funding for the program. The TSM program provides a skilled representative between the Intelligence School and the contractor. Many problems that occur in testing, evaluating and using complex systems are often eliminated or reduced through the TSM process.

Though not all encompassing, this article has attempted to point out major milestones in the history of the Intelligence Center and School. Progress continues in the school, including the restructuring the CMF 33 and the redesignation of the Intelligence Training Battalion at Goodfellow AFB reported elsewhere in this issue. USAICS is currently forming the Training Support Company (CEWI) at Fort Huachuca to support this goal of training improvement.

"We believe that USAICS is in the forefront of the total Army effort in developing and using advanced approaches to meet the future needs of Military Intelligence," wrote Weinstein.

Dedication, hard work and effective leadership are the keys to keeping USAICS the "Home of Military Intelligence."

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